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FROM O.J. TO TIM MCVEIGH AND BEYOND: THE SUPREME
COURT'S TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AS
RINGMASTER IN THE EXPANDING MEDIA CIRCUS
JOHN A. WALTON*
Imagine what could happen if the latent local passions were aroused
through channels provided by radio and television. Then there might
be no place to which the trial could be transferred to protect the ac-
cused.'
INTRODUCTION
When Justice Douglas spoke these words nearly forty years ago, he
probably intended to make a rhetorical, rather than a prophetic, state-
ment. Nonetheless, on March 14, 1997, the attorneys for Timothy
McVeigh attempted to make prophecy of Douglas's speculation.2
McVeigh was one of two men accused of bombing the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City.3 One hundred sixty-eight
people died in the explosion, which caused an estimated $651,594,000 in
total incidental costs. 4 Emotionally intense news coverage in Oklahoma
was of such magnitude that a United States District Court held that wide-
spread prejudice among the citizens of the state prevented the defendants
from receiving a fair and impartial trial.5 As a result, the case was trans-
ferred to Denver, Colorado.6
* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.S., 1976, Illinois State
University; M.S., 1978, Illinois State University; J.D., 1986, Northwestern University School of
Law. Many thanks to my colleagues at the College of Law and particularly to Professors Jeffrey A.
Parness and James J. Alfini for their early input and continued support during this research. Thanks
to Professor Kathleen Coles for editorial assistance. Thanks also to my research assistants, Angela
Wu and Tammy M. Westoff, for their hard work. Special thanks to my wife and family.
1. Justice Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1960). This article is based on an address delivered by Justice William 0. Douglas at the University
of Colorado Law School on May 10, 1960. See id. at 1 n.*.
2. See Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Request for Abatement or Other Relief, with
Supporting Memorandum of Law at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL
117366 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 1997) (Motion of Defendant Timothy McVeigh) [hereinafter Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss] (claiming that national media coverage of his alleged confession made it impos-
sible for him to receive a fair trial).
3. For a brief factual and procedural history of the early stages of the McVeigh case, see
United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (W.D. Okla. 1996). McVeigh and his codefen-
dant, Terry Lynn Nichols, were charged with using a truck bomb and completely destroying the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1469-74.
6. Id. at 1474-75.
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On February 28, 1997, just one month before the beginning of his
trial, the Dallas Morning News announced via the Internet that defendant
Timothy McVeigh had confessed to the bombing.' The news spread
quickly, and by March 1, 1997, the story was being broadcast nation-
wide.' Two weeks before his trial, McVeigh filed a motion to dismiss the
entire prosecution based on this prejudicial pretrial publicity. The federal
district court dismissed it in short order." McVeigh responded with a writ
of prohibition that he filed in the Tenth Circuit, seeking review of the
District Court's ruling." The court denied the writ with similar dispatch.
The fact that McVeigh experienced prejudicial pretrial publicity
shortly before the beginning of his trial is nothing new.'3 The fact that the
story received national coverage is similarly familiar." Also common in
high profile trials is the defendant's request for a change of venue.'5 What
7. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 1. For discussion of the McVeigh Mo-
tion to Dismiss, see infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
8. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 1.
9. Id.
10. Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Request for Abatement or Other Relief, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL
117369 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion] (denying McVeigh's Motion
to Dismiss).
11. Petitioner-Defendant Timothy James McVeigh's Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Brief
in Support (Redacted), McVeigh v. Matsch, No. 97-1117, 1997 WL 194126 (10th Cir. Mar. 27,
1997) [hereinafter Defendant's Petition for Writ].
12. Order In re Timothy James McVeigh, Petitioner, McVeigh v. Matsch, No. 97-1117, 1997
WL 154760 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Order] (denying writ of prohibition).
13. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338-42 (1966) (beginning of prejudicial
pretrial publicity occurred when the Assistant County Attorney, who became Sheppard's chief
prosecutor, publicly criticized the refusal of the Sheppard family to permit his immediate question-
ing); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) (holding that, considering the nature of the
media coverage, the Court could find juror bias without review of the juror voir dire testimony, and
that due process of law required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's television interview); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). In Irvin,
existing intensive pretrial publicity made it impossible for jurors to set aside opinions or impressions
and render a verdict based on evidence presented in court. id. This pretrial publicity consisted, in
part, of press releases issued by the prosecutor stating that the defendant had confessed to six mur-
ders. Id. at 719.
14. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975);
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 333; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 717; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H.
1993); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972); People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976). For a discussion of cases receiving national publicity, see Robert
Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases in National Notoriety:
Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39 (1996).
15. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 346; Estes, 381 U.S. at 535; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 720; Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the
Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min
Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1615-18 (1996) (noting that the McVeigh trial's change of venue
to another state, though unusual, was of little value in reducing the risk of bias resulting from pretrial
publicity).
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is uncommon, however, was McVeigh's attempt to have his indictment
dismissed because of prejudicial pretrial publicity, such that he would be
insulated from federal prosecution. This has been labeled
unprecedented.'6 Interestingly, McVeigh's motion came on the heels of
another criminal prosecution considered unprecedented-the double
murder trial of O.J. Simpson.'7 In contrast to McVeigh's procedural
move, commentators labeled the Simpson case as unprecedented because
of the media coverage it received.'8
A peculiar link exists between Simpson and McVeigh. Prior to the
O.J. Simpson trials, neither the courts, nor the country, had witnessed
pretrial coverage so pervasive that it could provide a basis for the motion
McVeigh filed, to dismiss an indictment on the basis that an entire nation
of potential jurors had been contaminated by media coverage of pretrial
events.'9 Throughout the Simpson prosecution, media coverage of events
was so extensive that an entire nation of prospective jurors were aware
of, and apparently held strong opinions about, the defendant's guilt or
innocence.'
Moreover, there is reason to believe that those who concluded
Simpson was guilty before or during the trial were not persuaded by his
acquittal.2' It is startling to consider, for example, that a prominent law
professor such as Ronald Allen would acknowledge that, while unable to
observe the evidence presented to the jury, he knew Simpson was guilty
based on what he had heard from the media.22 Allen reasoned that one
16. Brief of the United States in Opposition to McVeigh's Motion for Dismissal or "Abate-
ment" at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 117368 (D. Colo. Mar, 14,
1997) (stating that McVeigh's motion to dismiss the indictment and his attempt to insulate himself
from federal prosecution was unprecedented).
17. See Nina Burleigh, Preliminary Judgments, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 55, 60 (quoting well-
known First Amendment specialist Floyd Abrams who, when discussing the Simpson case said, "It
is so extraordinary and idiosyncratic by the standards of any trial in history ... ").
18. Id. at 56 (referring to the estimated seventy million people who viewed the low-speed
highway chase that preceded Simpson's arrest, and quoting University of California law professor
Peter Arenella who noted, "we have never seen a case like [Simpson's]").
19. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *2; infra notes 195-208 and accom-
panying text; see also Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need
for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 97 (1995) (stating
that "the scope of publicity surrounding certain criminal cases has now reached unprecedented
levels").
20. See Minnefor, supra note 19, at 97-99. Minnefor suggests that trials like the Simpson trial
have received unprecedented national media coverage largely due to the expanding coverage of
cable television, which she attributes to a rise in tabloid-style programs. Id. at 107-08. She believes
that the mainstream press has begun to offer a similar style of coverage in order to compete with
these tabloid-type shows. Id. The result is "pervasive publicity both before and during the trial which
impacts the jury's view of the case." Id. at 99.
21. See Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and
Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 989, 989 (1996) ("[A] vicious crime has gone unpunished and
the likely perpetrator now walks among us free from the risk of criminal liability, his presence a
constant reminder of the injustice that was done ... .
22. Id.
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need not go around the world to know it is "a sphere of some kind and
not flat."" Applying this in the context of Simpson, this is similar to
saying, "he is guilty of something ('a sphere of some kind'), and not in-
nocent ('flat')." Though the press provides neither the standard, nor the
appropriate source, of proof in criminal trials, media coverage was ap-
parently sufficient to support a conviction of Simpson in some courts of
public opinion."
Professor Allen observed that
the citizens of the country saw with their own eyes the acquittal of an
obviously guilty man of a vicious crime of violence, and they-we-
realize that the primary point of all the political rhetoric about rights
is the protection of innocent people from false convictions,. . .not the
protection of violent criminals from the consequences of their
actions."
This statement is indicative of precisely the type of fixed opinions the
Supreme Court has condemned when considering the effect of pretrial
publicity--publicity that would fix the venire's, or empanelled jurors',
opinions such that they would be unaffected by the evidence presented at
trial. 6 If the "citizens of the country" were not persuaded by a not guilty
verdict, could they be less resistant to its underlying evidence? Even
those who believe that Simpson's acquittal indicates a working jury sys-
tem must acknowledge widespread opinion that Simpson's verdict was
simply the result of jury nullification and racial bias.28 The critical point
for this discussion is not that perceptions of guilt or innocence in the
23. Id. at 990.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin, the trial court excused over half of the
prospective jurors for holding biased pretrial opinions based on extensive media coverage. Id. at 727.
The Supreme Court emphasized that with preconceptions of guilt, "[tihe influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental proc-
esses of the average man." Id. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion also addressed pretrial pub-
licity's impact on jurors' opinions, asking, "How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested
verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their
minds were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to establish the
guilt of the accused." Id. at 729-30.
27. Allen, supra note 21, at 990.
28. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Through a Glass Diversely: The OJ. Simpson Trial as Racial
Rorschach Test, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996). Professor Cottrol noted that, following the
Simpson criminal verdict, the public concluded that jury nullification had occurred, and "[flew
public commentators were willing to consider whether a good case might be made in support of the
jury's verdict." Id. Professor Cottrol sees the Simpson trial putting at issue the fact that racism has
penetrated, and is tolerated, in the nation's police departments. Id. at 914; see also Richard A. Bos-
well, Crossing the Racial Divide: Challenging Stereotypes About Black Jurors, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 233, 235-36 (1995) (noting the widely held stereotype that the jury's decision in the
Simpson trial was motivated by race, rather than evidence); John Leo, The Color of the Law, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at 24 (citing the Wall Street Journal's report of racial nullifi-
cation among jurors "humming right along").
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Simpson case were often dismissed as racially motivated. ' It is whether
those perceptions, nationwide, were'a result of the media circus that pre-
ceded Simpson's trial.'
The arguable impact of the Simpson-type pretrial circus-nationwide
bias-was tested by McVeigh's motion to dismiss. This is odd because
the McVeigh prosecution, while forced from its forum state by early me-
dia coverage,3' has been described as a "circus-free" example of judicial
control over a high-publicity trial. 2 It is interesting, therefore, to consider
the theoretical viability of McVeigh's motion to dismiss if it had been
based on Simpson's pretrial coverage instead of McVeigh's.
The position taken in this article is that, after years of steady in-
creases, the media coverage of high profile trials went overboard in the
Simpson criminal case. This is noteworthy because Supreme Court
precedent since the 1960s holds that, at some ambiguous level, media
coverage of a criminal proceeding may be sufficient to create a pre-
sumption of bias against the defendant in all who witnessed it. Such
fixed opinions render prospective jurors unfit to serve. Thus, national
media coverage, like that exemplified by the Simpson trial, could result
in precluding an entire nation of potential jurors. The result of this pre-
clusion would be the success of a motion to dismiss, like that filed by
McVeigh. With that in mind, this article examines the test applied by the
Supreme Court to determine whether a particular venire of prospective
jurors is presumptively biased. It also evaluates the Court's voir dire re-
quirements for the trial court identifying media based bias in individual
potential jurors. The article concludes that, by applying the test as cur-
rently construed, the Court can indefinitely evade a presumption of na-
tionwide jury bias. In the case of coverage like that in the Simpson trial,
however, the Court risks jeopardizing the defendant's constitutional right
to an impartial jury by using current voir dire requirements. The sug-
gested solution to this problem requires trial courts to consider the ele-
ments of pretrial publicity that the Supreme Court has evaluated when
holding that bias could be presumed, in order to determine when exten-
sive voir dire is constitutionally mandated.
Part I recounts the historical conflict between the media's unfettered
rights in generating pretrial publicity and the protection of the venire
29. See Cottrol, supra note 28, at 915 (stating "it was ... the way the press framed the trial
and the issues surrounding the public reaction to it that helped transform the trial of O.J. Simpson...
into a presumed arena of racial confrontation").
30. See Minnefor, supra note 19, at 99 n.15 (reporting empirical evidence results showing
jurors' attitudes to be affected by "extreme exposure" to pretrial publicity) (citing Symposium, What
Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for Impartial-
ity, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 547, 551 (1991)).
31. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
32. See Ryan Ross, McVeigh's Trial Lean and Trim, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 24 (lauding the
"circus-free" atmosphere of the McVeigh trial, and describing U.S. District Court Judge Richard
Matsch's control over the proceedings as a "model of judicial efficiency").
1998]
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from pretrial publicity bias. Part II discusses the tests the Supreme Court
has employed to evaluate the impact of media based bias, and the Court's
attempts to diminish or prevent that impact. This part notes the apparent
change in the tenor of the Court's decisions following Sheppard v. Max-
well. Part III considers the factual elements of pretrial events to which
those tests have been applied. Part IV discusses the "totality of circum-
stances" test, as construed by Murphy v. Florida and subsequent cases,
and finds that the level of national jury bias alleged in the McVeigh mo-
tion could not sustain a dismissal under the current test. Part IV con-
cludes that, under current voir dire requirements, the Court's refusal to
presume bias may jeopardize defendants' fair trial rights in high profile
cases. Part V proposes a solution, suggesting that certain types of pretrial
publicity should trigger constitutionally mandated questions during voir
dire about what publicity prospective jurors specifically witnessed.
In conclusion, this article'fids that under the current test, there is
no amount of coverage sufficient to establish a presumption of bias for
the entire national venire. Therefore, a case like McVeigh will be ana-
lyzed in accord with the Supreme Court's holding in Mu'Min v.
Virginia,33 which upholds the trial court's reliance on individual jurors'
assurances that they can be fair and impartial. Moreover, the article sug-
gests that the magnitude of the Simpson media coverage puts at issue the
level of trial coverage required before the court can presume bias. Ap-
plying the totality of circumstances test, arguably, the Court can use the
Simpson trial coverage as a basis for holding that a new standard of pre-
trial publicity is the appropriate test for national bias; that what was suf-
ficient to prove or presume bias under the circumstances examined in, for
example, Sheppard v. Maxwell, is not enough for McVeigh and that what
might satisfy the test for McVeigh, will not satisfy the test for a subse-
quent high profile defendant like McVeigh's alleged co-conspirator,
Terry Nichols.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONFLIcT BETWEEN FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIALS
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial and impartial jury is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution' 4 The free press guarantee
has equally substantial underpinnings. 5 There is, however, a long history
of conflict between the two,3 rooted in the fact that the framers did not
33. 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed...").
35. U.S. CONST. amend.-I (providing, in part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ").
36. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1897) (No. 14,692G). Chief Justice
Marshall faced the acute problem of finding a jury pool that had not formed opinions concerning
Burr, whose prosecution for planning to invade Mexico had been detailed in a Virginia newspaper.
Id. That the Chief Justice conducted a searching voir dire of the jury panel to draw out bias indicates
[Vol. 75:2
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prioritize constitutional rights.3" Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
declined to take a position regarding conflicting free press and fair trial
rights,38 instead wavering between the two, and championing whichever
is threatened at a given time. For example, in acknowledging the histori-
cal primacy of the rights guaranteed to the press by the First Amend-
ment, the Court has stated, "[T]he unqualified prohibitions laid down by
the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other
liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly
society."39 While the Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance
an individual's right to a fair trial with the "passions of the populace"
impact of the press in influencing potential jurors, it has at times ap-
peared willing to risk potential jury bias in the interests of preserving a
free press.'
that the dichotomy between an unbiased jury and free press is not new. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 2 (concluding that the Constitution puts no qualifica-
tion on the freedom of the press).
38. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,729 (1961). Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence,
found the influence of the press in jeopardizing fair trials as violative of the decencies guaranteed by
the Constitution, though the press was constitutionally protected in its reporting. He acknowledged
the Court's dilemma in this constitutional conflict, stating:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must be
subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press,
properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be re-
versed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential jurors
were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.
Id.
See also Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 547-48 (finding that neither the Constitution nor contempora-
neous writings addressed the conflict between freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946) (noting that courts must balance between freedom
of the press and the right to a fair trial).
39. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). The majority opinion noted that James
Madison, the leader in the drafting of the First Amendment, recognized that England's Magna Carta,
the forerunner of all modem constitutions, did not secure the rights of freedom of the press. 1 GALES
& SEATON'S HISTORY OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 453 (Joseph Gales & Seaton eds.,
1834), cited in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 264. Madison also wrote that "the state of the press, therefore,
under the common law, cannot... be the standard of its freedom in the United States." Letter from
James Madison to James Currie (Jan. 28, 1786), in VI WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at
387 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906), quoted in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 264. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Our
liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." 9 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239.
40. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 570. The Court held that a prior restraint on speech
is the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights, necessitating a heavy
burden to secure that in this case had not been met. Id. The Court stated that pretrial publicity-even
pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. Id. at 554. Furthermore, the
tone and extent of the publicity affecting an impaneled jury may be shaped by the actions of attor-
neys, police, other officials, and, most importantly, the trial judge. Id. at 555; see also Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1975) (finding that a defendant on trial for armed robbery was not
denied a fair trial regardless of the extensive news coverage of defendant's past crimes and jurors'
knowledge of defendant's criminal record); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1952)
(finding that despite the district attorney's premature release of the defendant's murder confession,
and inflammatory newspaper accounts, the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a
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Notwithstanding the Court's broad interpretation of free press
rights, it has simultaneously endeavored to balance defendants' rights to
fair trials, expressing a need to protect fair trial rights when they are
threatened by the media's overzealous exercise of its First Amendment
privileges." In Estes v. Texas, the Court acknowledged the press as "a
mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs,
exposing corruption among public officers and employees, and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court
proceedings." ' The Court, however, continued by stating that "[w]hile
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this impor-
tant function in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process. '
The historical dichotomy between free press and fair trials predates
television as the dominant medium of trial coverage." But the Court rec-
ognized the potential hazards associated with televised trials when televi-
sion was still in its relative infancy. 5 Moreover, television commentary
outside the courthouse, and its implications, was not unanticipated.4 Yet
fair trial because of absence of affirmative showing that any community prejudice ever existed, or
even affected, the jury).
41. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965). Estes's conviction for swindling
was overturned after the Court concluded that he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process because of the televising and broadcasting of his pretrial hearings. Id. In Estes, the
pretrial publicity accumulated to eleven volumes of press clippings, illustrating the case's national
notoriety. Id. at 535. Furthermore, the hearings were carried live by radio and television. Id. The
Court noted that "[piretrial ... [publicity] may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it
may well set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." Id.; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 471-72, 474 (1965) (holding that due process guarantees the criminally accused a jury trial by a
panel of impartial, indifferent jurors, and was violated when two deputy sheriffs giving key testi-
mony that led to defendant's conviction had charge of the jury, and while discharging their duties,
fraternized with them outside the courtroom); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724, 726 (1963)
(reversing the conviction of a defendant whose staged, highly emotional confession had been filmed
with the cooperation of local police, and subsequently broadcasted on television for three days while
awaiting trial, the Court stating "[any subsequent court proceeding in a community so pervasively
exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-28
(1961) (holding that intensive pretrial publicity, which included a statement by the prosecutor that
defendant had confessed to six murders, made it impossible for jurors to lay aside opinions or im-
pressions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court). But see, e.g., Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-93 (1952) (holding that newspaper accounts of petitioner's murder
conviction did not cause such prejudice in the community as to deprive him of that "fundamental
fairness" essential to the concept of justice and a fair trial, when the majority of the publicity was
immediately prior or subsequent to arrest and not during the trial itself).
42. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692G); supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 541. The Court quoted Justice Douglas's article, which argued
against televising court proceedings because of "the insidious influences which [televising] puts to
work on the administration of justice." Id.; see Douglas, supra note 1, at 9.
46. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540. Justice Douglas's article was in response to actions by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in 1956, which adopted the report of a referee that recommended televising or
broadcasting trials at the discretion of the trial judge, provided this would not "detract from the
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fair trial rights, though often touted as supreme in the federal courts,'
have not enjoyed a clear mandate of supremacy in cases where free press
and fair trial rights have been in conflict. ' The manifestations of this
ambiguous demarcation between free press and fair trial are evident in
several areas, and have perplexed the Supreme Court for decades.' For
example, that the freedom of the press is broadly protected by the First
Amendment is further demonstrated by the Court's historical antipathy
towards orders restraining the press.' And, while the power of the courts
to protect themselves from media related disturbances has long been rec-
ognized,' attempts to expand the contempt power have, at times, evoked
popular reaction favoring the free press. 2 One ramification of this di-
chotomy is the regular attempts by the Court to balance the media's
rights to pretrial reporting and the defendant's rights to a fair trial." At
dignity thereof, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, or otherwise materi-
ally interfere with the achievement of a fair trial .... In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956).
47. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (declaring that courts must take
"strong measures" to ensure trials by impartial juries); Estes, 381 U.S. at 540 (stating that "[wle have
always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of
all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs," and that the court accomplishes this good "through
rules, contempt proceedings and reversal of convictions obtained under unfair conditions"); Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918), overruled by Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33 (1941) (upholding contempt convictions of two newspapers on grounds they prejudiced a
pending judicial action).
48. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Smart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing order restraining the
media from publishing or broadcasting admissions and information which implicated the defendant).
49. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that,
every term, the Court reviewed claims that a trial had been distorted by inflammatory news coverage
affecting potential jurors).
50. See, e.g., Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 539 ; Alberto Bemabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on
the Media and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 Ky. L.J. 259, 288-89
(1996) (indicating that only two restraining orders have survived constitutional attack since Ne-
braska Press).
51. Compare Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907) (dismissing petitioner's
contempt proceeding for lack of jurisdiction, while stating that "the propriety and necessity of pre-
venting interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument, or intimidation
hardly can be denied"), with In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 257-59 (1948). In Oliver, the Court granted
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus because he was sentenced to jail in haste and secrecy by a one-
man judge/grand jury in Michigan. Id. The Court found that the defendant had been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at
267. It noted, however, that "[t]he narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only
charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's busi-
ness . I... d. at 275.
52. Bridges v. Califomia, 314 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1941). The Court cited the case of Judge
Peck, who had impeachment proceedings brought against him as a result of his summary punishment
of a lawyer for publishing a comment on a case that was on appeal. This case led to legislation;
Congress enacted a statute concerning the power of federal courts to inflict summary punishment for
contempt, and specified that the contempt power "shall not be construed to extend to any cases
except the misbehaviour of. .. persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice .... Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (1831).
53. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 730. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter states that
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in
States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has
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such times, the Court applied several standards and tests, addressing is-
sues ranging from prior restraint of the press in order to preserve trial
integrity, to reversal of convictions when unrestrained press coverage
compromised a fair trial."
II. THE TESTS FOR BALANCING FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS
Reviewing the Supreme Court decisions addressing the conflict
between fair trials and free press reveals a history punctuated with vari-
ous tests for determining when the scales tip for, or against, the defen-
dant, or the media. In evaluating whether pretrial publicity has caused
bias, the Court appears to be searching for a test (or at least a way of
describing the test it selected) that would provide the appearance of a
concrete standard, with the flexibility to contend with the unpredictable
future of pretrial, and trial, media coverage.
Early standards adopted by the Court evaluated the authority of the
trial court to punish, through contempt proceedings, publicity that might
influence a trial." One such test, or standard, was whether the publication
at issue had the "reasonable tendency" to influence matters of law pend-
ing before the court.' In Patterson v. Colorado and Toledo Newspaper v.
United States, for example, the issue was the trial courts' ability to issue
contempt orders punishing these types of publications." The standard
applied by the Court was whether the publication had the "reasonable
tendency" to impact the judge's decision."
One year after its decision in Toledo Newspaper to adopt the "rea-
sonable tendency" standard, the Court decided Schenck v. United States"
and applied a "clear and present danger" test, raising the issue of the
limitations on free speech rights.' In Schenck, the defendants were con-
victed of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets calculated
been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as in this case,
with the prosecutor's collaboration-exerting pressure on potential jurors before trial ....
"Id.
54. See infra Part II.
55. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), overruled by Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941) (sustaining the trial court's contempt authority when publica-
tion had a "reasonable tendency" to impact the judge's decision); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 460 (1907) (stating that publications about matters pending before a court that tended toward
interference with the court's administration of the law were punishable by contempt).
56. Toledo, 247 U.S. at 421; Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63.
57. Toledo, 247 U.S. at 410 ("[Tlhe situation is controlled by the reasonable tendencies of the
acts done [to influence matters pending before the court] .... "); Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63
(noting that a publication concerning a matter of law pending before the court is punishable if it is
"tending toward ... interference" with that matter).
58. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63 (noting that the publication at issue was no less subject to
contempt because the matter was before a judge instead of a jury).
59. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
60. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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to cause insubordination by military service recruits during war time.6'
Applying the clear and present danger test to the defendants' speech, the
Court stated: "The question in every case is whether the words used are
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent."'2 The Court noted that whether the test was
satisfied depended not only upon the words spoken, but the circum-
stances in which they were said.63 Because the defendants in Schenck
were not members of the press, the Court did not consider whether the
"clear and present danger" test was applicable to limit the First Amend-
ment freedoms guaranteed the press. Yet, the Court in Schenck articu-
lated a test which set the stage for protecting free press rights in the fu-
ture when it linked the stricter standards of the clear and present danger
test with the flexibility of considering the surrounding circumstances to
evaluate whether speech was constitutionally protected.
During the 1940s, however, the Court took strides to better protect
the First Amendment rights of the press. In Nye v. United States," for
example, the Court overturned Toledo Newspaper, holding that it had
improperly enlarged the contempt authority of the trial court6 5 That same
year, in Bridges v. California," the Court applied the "clear and present
danger" test to speech by the press, to determine whether a publication
should be deprived of constitutional protection.67 In doing so, the Court
simultaneously rejected the "reasonable tendency" standard, finding that
a reasonable tendency to interfere with the court's administration of jus-
tice was not sufficient to justify restriction of free speech." The Supreme
Court reversed the contempt order, holding that the clear and present
danger test mandates that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished.' Responding to the state's assertion that the substantive evil
61. Id. at48-49.
62. Id. at 52.
63. Id. (noting that many constitutionally protected statements made in times of peace may be
stripped of such protection in times of war).
64. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
65. Nye, 313 U.S. at 52.
66. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
67. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 261-62. The Bridges Court used the clear and present danger test,
stating that "there must be a determination of whether or not 'the words.., used in such circum-
stances... are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils."' Id. at 261 (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52). The Bridges Court also noted that
even when there is a likelihood of substantive evil, the evil itself must be substantial. Bridges, 314
U.S. at 362 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see
also Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947) (holding that the trial court had no power to
punish for contempt when reporting is inaccurate on cases pending before it and awaiting disposi-
tion, unless that reporting causes an imminent threat to the administration of justice).
68. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 272-73. Bridges involved two California newspapers adjudged guilty
of contempt for publishing comments pertaining to pending labor union litigation. Id. at 271.
69. Id. at 278.
70. Id. at 263.
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feared by publication is the disorderly and unfair administration of jus-
tice, the Court noted that "[l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won
through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspapers."7'
Nevertheless, the Court found it inappropriate to initially assume that
publications dealing with pending cases threaten fair trials.72 The Court
reasoned that, rather than grant the judiciary a contempt power to close
communications on pending matters, a study of the circumstances that
surround the particular utterance is a more appropriate way to determine
the likelihood that the feared evils will occur." Though the Court in
Bridges did not enunciate a totality of circumstances standard, it was
consistent with Schenck, focusing on the particular nature of the words
spoken and the circumstances of their publication, when evaluating the
constitutional protection afforded trial-related press coverage."4 Yet, the
Court in Schenk articulated a test which set the stage for protecting free
press rights in the future when it linked the stricter standards of the clear
and present danger test with the flexibility of considering the surrounding
circumstances to evaluate whether speech was constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court affirmed the "clear and present danger" stan-
dard in Pennekamp v. State of Florida,7 a case against the Miami Herald,
and an individual editor, for publishing two editorials. These defendants
were charged with being contemptuous of the circuit court and its judges,
on the grounds that they were unlawfully critical of the court's admini-
stration of criminal justice in certain cases pending before it."6 The Su-
preme Court stated that public comment about pending cases may not be
as free as similar comment on cases after complete disposal.' Moreover,
the Court was not insensitive to the risks some publicized comments
pose for trials, stating that in borderline cases, "the specific freedom of
public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given the wid-
est range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and or-
derly administration of justice."' The Court, in agreement with the Flor-
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 270 (affirming the clear and present danger standard).
75. 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946).
76. Pennekanip, 328 U.S. at 333. The editorials at issue criticized the Florida circuit judges
specifically for not accepting the eight indictments for rape from the grand jury, stating, "[W]hen
judicial instance and interpretative procedure recognize and accept, even go out to find, every possi-
ble technicality of the law to protect the defendant, to block, thwart, hinder, embarrass and nullify
prosecution, then the people's rights are jeopardized and the basic reason for courts stultified." Id. at
336 n.4.
77. Id. at 346. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted "that in a particular contro-
versy pending before a court," people should not be swayed from impartiality by extraneous influ-
ences. Id. at 366. A pending controversy is a proceeding that has been put at issue in the court and is
still there. Id. at 369.
78. Id. at 347.
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ida courts, found that the editorials in question did not report the full
truth about the pending cases, and failed to objectively state the attitude
of the judges.' Nonetheless, it held that such comment could not create a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice.'
The Supreme Court has reiterated the strong position favoring the
media's First Amendment freedoms while covering trials which it stated
in cases like Bridges v. California and Pennekamp v. Florida.' While
maintaining this position, however, the Court also began to consider the
ability of unrestricted publicity to bias prospective jurors, and the con-
comitant risk of that bias affecting the defendant's ability to obtain a fair
trial." In Stroble v. California, for example, the Court held that, despite
the District Attorney's premature release of the defendant's confession to
murder, and inflammatory newspaper accounts, the defendant had not
been deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because he failed to
make an affirmative showing that any community prejudice existed, or
affected, the jury. 3 Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that the decision
contravened the requirement that guilt be assessed on evidence adduced
at trial." His theory gained momentum in Marshall v. United States,
when the Court granted the defendant a new trial on the grounds of jury
exposure to evidence in newspaper articles that had been ruled inadmis-
sible at trial.' In Marshall, the Court did not reach the constitutional is-
sues regarding free press and fair trials because it granted the new trial
under its supervisory authority to establish and apply standards for
proper enforcement of criminal law in federal courts.'
The Court took a significant step toward better protecting criminal
defendants' fair trial rights in Irvin v. Dowd.' In Irvin, the defendant was
charged with having committed six murders in the vicinity of a rural In-
diana community.' Intense publicity in the county in which the defen-
dant was to be tried included reports that he had confessed to the mur-
ders."9 As a result, defendant's counsel sought, and was granted, a change
79. Id. at 344-45.
80. Id. at 348.
81. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (reaffirming Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 331 (stating that "reporters of all media, including
television, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in
open court through their respective media").
82. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (finding that, despite a change of venue,
defendant failed to receive an impartial trial, since voir dire examination of the final jurors reflected
a "pattern of deep and bitter [community] prejudice" created by adverse pretrial publicity); Marshall
v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (reversing conviction that was based on prejudicial
information jurors received through news reports); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193 (1952).
83. Stroble, 343 U.S. at 194-95.
84. Id. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
85. Marshall, 360 U.S. at 312-13.
86. Id. at 313.
87. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
88. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 719-20.
89. Id.
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of venue, but the court moved the trial to the' adjoining rural county,
which had seen similarly inflammatory coverage. ° The defendant was
denied further changes of venue pursuant to an Indiana statute that al-
lowed only one venue change.9' During voir dire the trial court judge
individually questioned members of the jury panel whom the defendant
had challenged for cause on the basis that they had been biased by pre-
trial media coverage." When questioned, each of the challenged jurors
indicated he or she could be impartial despite any preconceived
opinions. 3
On review, the Supreme Court said that "[tlo hold that the mere ex-
istence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an ac-
cused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospec-
tive juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard.''
The Court, however, examined the trial court's voir dire transcript and
found that the defendant did not receive an impartial trial because, not-
withstanding their oaths to the contrary, the juror's voir dire testimony
reflected a pattern of deep and bitter community prejudice created by
adverse pretrial publicity." The Court applied a standard of clear and
convincing evidence to the question of whether the voir dire evidenced
prejudiceY While it did not expressly adopt a "totality of circumstances"
test to find jury bias, it did conduct a detailed review of all of the media-
related incidents occurring before defendant's trial, and concluded that,
"in the light of the circumstances here, the finding of [juror] impartiality
does not meet constitutional standards."'8
Two years after Irvin, in Rideau v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court
held that certain types of press coverage and content are so inherently
prejudicial as to create, the presumption that a fair trial is impossible.'° In
Rideau, the defendant, while in the sheriffs custody, confessed to par-
90. Id. at 720.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 724.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 723.
95. Id. at 727.
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id. at 727. The clear and convincing evidence standard is less strict than the clear and
present danger test. The Court, however, applied the lower standard not to evaluate the constitution-
ality of a contempt order against the press (akin to prior restraint), but to determine whether the
media coverage had caused provable bias.
98. Id. at 725-28.
99. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
100. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1965) (addressing
the State's contention that televising portions of a criminal trial does not constitute a denial of due
process). In Estes, the Court acknowledged the public's right to be informed about events which
transpire in a courtroom. Id. at 541-42. In holding that bias could be presumed based on the televi-
sion coverage of a trial, however, the Court stated that a showing of actual prejudice was not a
prerequisite to a finding that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. at 542.
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ticipating in a robbery and homicide.'"' The confession was filmed and
broadcast several times on the local television station, before the defen-
dant's arraignment for the crimes."'° He was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death for the murder charge, and ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court for a reversal, arguing that his due process rights had
been denied.0 3 The Court, in reversing the conviction, stated "that due
process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a
community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised
'interview.""' The Court did not state that it was presuming bias, but the
presumption is indicated by the fact that the Court established no nexus
between those jurors who viewed the confession, and their actual opinion
as to defendant's guilt.'5' Indeed, the Court stated that it did not need to
examine the jurors' voir dire transcripts to conclude that due process had
been denied.'"
In contrast to Irvin, in which the Court considered all of the circum-
stances of pretrial publicity, the Rideau Court focused exclusively on
defendant's broadcast confession as a basis for finding presumed or in-
herent bias." The Court identified the presumed bias of Rideau as inher-
ent prejudice in Estes v. Texas."'° In Estes, the Court overturned the de-
fendant's conviction for swindling, concluding he was deprived of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by the televising and broad-
casting of his pretrial hearings."'° The Court applied the inherent preju-
dice rule established by Rideau, at the same time distinguishing its analy-
sis therein from the detailed examination of circumstances conducted in
Irvin and Stroble, to determine if prejudice was the actual result of the
media coverage, as opposed to a presumption of bias based on the nature
of the coverage."' Nonetheless, the Estes Court conducted a thorough
evaluation of the pretrial publicity circumstances before concluding that
101. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723-74.
102. Id. at 724.
103. Id. at 724-26.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. This failure to link the broadcast interview to the bias of prospective jurors was the
basis of Justice Clark's dissent. Justice Clark stated that "[ulnless the adverse publicity is shown by
the record to have fatally infected the trial, there is simply no basis for the Court's inference that the
publicity, epitomized by the televised interview, called up some informal and illicit analogy to res
judicata, which made petitioner's trial a meaningless formality." Id. at 729 (citing Beck v. Wash-
ington, 369 U.S. 541, 558 (1962)).
106. Id. at 727. The Court also stated that
For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this
spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense
was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court pro-
ceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hol-
low formality.
Id. at 726.
107. Id. at 726-27.
108. 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1959).
109. Estes, 381 U.S. at 534-35.
110. Id.at543-44.
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a presumption of prejudice was appropriate."' The Court implied that a
broad view of circumstances was necessary when confronting the impact
of televised court proceedings, stating that "one cannot put his finger on
[television's] specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he
was prejudiced."' 2
While these cases offered some relief to defendants subjected to
extraordinary pretrial publicity, the relief was purely retrospective-re-
versing a conviction rendered defective by the prejudicial publicity-as
opposed to a prospective attempt to protect the defendant's fair trial
rights at the trial court level. In these cases the Supreme Court imposed
no limits on the press, nor suggested the ways in which the trial courts
might prevent, limit, or control the types of extreme coverage that had
resulted in reversible convictions."3 In the 1966 case of Sheppard v.
Maxwell,"" however, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inadequacy
of reversals, 11 and suggested means to contemporaneously deal with
prejudicial publicity during pretrial and trial."" The Court overturned
Sheppard's conviction on the grounds that media coverage of the events
surrounding his wife's murder, and his arrest and trial for that murder,
deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights."' In re-
111. Id. at 550-52.
112. Id.at544.
113. See Sheldon Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REv. 393,405 (1977) (noting
that Supreme Court decisions for the twelve years preceding Sheppard made no suggestions as to
how prejudicial pretrial publicity could be prevented); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (noting that none of the Court's previous cases addressing prior restraint in-
volved orders restricting publicity in an effort to protect a defendant's right to an unbiased jury).
114. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
115. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63. The Court stated, "[WMe must remember that reversals are
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its incep-
tion. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences." Id. at 363.
116. Id. at 358-63 (suggesting limiting the number of reporters in the courtroom; insulating the
trial witnesses from the press; controlling leads, statements, and gossip by police, court personnel,
witnesses, and attorneys; warning reporters of the impropriety of publishing information not intro-
duced in the proceeding; continuations; sequestration; and reversal).
117. Id. at 362-63. On July 9, 1954, Sheppard, at the coroner's request re-enacted the crime for
the coroner, newsmen invited by him, and police officers. Id. at 338. The news media reported, in
detail, this re-enactment. Id. On July 21, in response to a news editorial entitled: "Why No Inquest?
Do It Now, Dr. Gerber," the coroner called an inquest beginning July 22. Id. at 339. The coroner, the
county prosecutor, and two detectives as bailiffs presided over the inquest, which lasted three days
and was broadcast live by television and radio personnel. Id. Sheppard's counsel was present, but
when he attempted to place documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected amidst cheers and hugs
from ladies in the audience. Id. at 340. Furthermore, the Court found that
Much of the material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard from the wit-
ness stand, such as the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the .. . investiga-
tion and [that he] must be guilty [because] he had hired a prominent ... lawyer, that
Sheppard was a perjurer, that he had sexual relations with numerous women; that his
slain wife had characterized him as a 'Jekyll-Hyde'; ... ; and ... that a woman convict
claimed Sheppard to be the father of her illegitimate child.
Id. at 356-57.
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versing, the Court, quoting Estes, said that convictions could be set aside
in the "absence of any showing of prejudice.""' 8 It applied the inherent
prejudice standard of Estes, noting that application of this standard to
Sheppard was warranted by the "totality of circumstances" in his case."9
When applying the inherent prejudice standard, the Court initially
took the position that the rights of criminal defendants in highly publi-
cized cases must be protected through strong measures that would not
favor the press.'" Within ten years, however, the Court appeared to re-
treat from these precedents, possibly evidencing a concern that these
opinions provided too broad a basis for challenging criminal convictions
in an atmosphere where trials were receiving increasing media
attention.'2 ' In Murphy v. Florida,'22 the Court, enunciating the "totality of
the circumstances" test, reviewed its prior decisions in Irvin, Rideau,
Estes, and Sheppard, and said that those decisions could not "be made to
stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state
defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with
which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due
process.'"" This statement indicates a significant turnabout from the
Court's totality of circumstances reference in Sheppard.'24 In Sheppard,
the Court referenced its holding in Estes and stated that the "totality of
circumstances" in Sheppard warranted that it be treated like Estes even
though the circumstances in the two cases were different (the Sheppard
case being the more compelling).'" In contrast, the Court in Murphy,
interpreted the totality of circumstances test as if it excluded cases that
contained factors indicating presumed prejudice resulting from pretrial
118. Id. at 352. The Court stated, "'It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is
deemed inherently lacking in due process."' Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1965)).
119. Id.
120. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. The Court stated, "Given the pervasiveness of modem
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the ac-
cused." Id.
121. See Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a
Free Press in Modem American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107, 1120-21 (1992) (discuss-
ing how the presumed (inherent) prejudice standard was diluted by the Court's decisions in Murphy
v. Florida and Patton v. Yount); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an
Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 643 (1991) (noting that, with the decision in Murphy
v. Florida, the Court had withdrawn reliance on presumed prejudice and began to insist on proof of
actual prejudice).
122. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
123. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799. These cases overturned the defendants' state court convictions
because the "trial atmosphere... had been utterly corrupted by press coverage." Id. at 798.
124. Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (adopting the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test), with Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799-803 (applying the "totality of circumstances" test
more narrowly than the Sheppard Court).
125. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 352-54.
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publicity, but did not indicate a totality of circumstances prevented the
defendant's trial from being fundamentally fair. 6
III. RIDEAU, ESTES AND SHEPPARD AS THREE CARD MONTE: PICK ANY
PRECEDENT BUT THE DEFENDANT STILL LOSES
After Murphy, the totality of circumstances test became a sort of
shell game, in that--due to ever changing circumstances-high publicity
defendants could rarely find the appropriate totality of circumstances
needed to establish presumed bias.
A. The Recurring Factors Which Provide Proof or Presumption of Bias
to the Venire
In Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, the Supreme Court focused
on several elements of pretrial and trial related media coverage that ap-
peared to be the cornerstones of proving or presuming bias to the venire
or individual jurors.'27 In Murphy, the focus changed and the Court's po-
sition was that all, rather than certain critical or pivotal circumstances are
considered for determining bias.'" On the one hand, this latter position
can be criticized because, if there is to be any consistency in the totality
of circumstances test, it rests in the recurrence of certain factors essential
to the Court's determination. On the other hand, under a Rideau analysis,
a fixed set of factors might tie the Court's hands, with the result being
the success of a McVeigh-type motion.
The following discussion considers the factors that the Court con-
sidered critical in the quadrant of 1960s cases, from Irvin through Shep-
pard. Though not the only factors now considered in the totality of cir-
cumstances test, they are the ones that were initially considered threat-
ening to fair trials. This article suggests that these factors have a con-
tinuing role in protecting the high-profile defendant's rights in the con-
temporary media circus. The critical factors were identified as follows:
1) exposure of jurors or the venire to information that was not admissi-
ble, or presented as evidence, at trial; 2) the existence of a community
pattern of thought, or unified opinion, among members of the venire; 3)
widespread media coverage and replay of an alleged or actual confession
by the defendant; 4) the media circus (denial, due to media attention, of a
defendant's privilege to have judicial serenity or calmness and solemnity
in the courtroom); and 5) media saturation of the venire with prejudicial
pretrial publicity.
126. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
127. See infra notes 160, 170 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part IV.A.
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1. Exposure of Jurors or the Venire to Information Which Was Not
Admissible or Presented as Evidence at Trial
A long time companion to a defendant's constitutional right to a
jury trial is the Supreme Court's position that the jury's verdict must be
the result of evidence developed and presented at trial.'29 Consistent with
this position, many courts have deemed media exposure of jurors or pro-
spective jurors to be highly prejudicial and inadmissible information as
significant in evaluating whether unfair bias exists.'" The risk of bias is
substantial because the media often reports the inadmissible information
as "evidence" of the defendant's guilt.'
Exposure to persuasive influences outside of the courtroom pro-
ceedings has also been a significant basis for the courts finding presumed
juror bias.' In Rideau, the Supreme Court set a landmark precedent in its
treatment of pretrial publicity when it held that trying the defendant in
the geographic region where prospective jurors had seen a television
broadcast of the defendant's confession was presumptively unfair.'33 The
Court stated that, having aired the confession to the venire, "[a]ny subse-
129. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692G) (requiring
jurors to be open-minded to testimony presented during trial). Likewise, in Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), the Supreme Court stated, "[C]onclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of
private talk or public print." This position has been reiterated in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 544 (1965) (stating that the "atmosphere essential to the preservation of a
fair trial . . . must be maintained at all costs" and the use of television "inject[s] ... an irrelevant
factor into court proceedings"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (stating that the "verdict
must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial"); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199, 204, 206 (1960) (reversing defendant's convictions for loitering and disorderly conduct because
there was no evidence in the record to support any of the charges, and stating that it is "a violation of
due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt"); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (stating that news accounts that the trial judge refused to admit into
evidence were prejudicial, and jurors' exposure to them entitled defendant to a new trial).
130. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 356-57. During trial, the unsequestered jurors were ex-
posed to claims that the defendant was a perjurer and bare-faced liar, a womanizer, and the father of
an illegitimate child. Id. There was also publicity equating his hiring of a prominent lawyer to an
admission of guilt. Id. None of these published claims, however, were ever presented as evidence at
trial. ld. at 356; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 535-44. In Estes, massive pretrial publicity consisted of
11 volumes of press clippings, live radio television broadcasts, and news photographs. Id. According
to the Court, this extensive publicity destroyed the atmosphere necessary in order for the accused to
receive a fair trial. Id.
131. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 359 n.13. The Court noted that the prosecution released much
"evidence" to the media that was never offered at trial or became part of the record and stated that
"[t]he exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make it avail-
able to the public." Id. at 360. The Court found that premature release and weighing of evidence by
the media could "jeopardize a defendant's right to an impartial jury." Id. at 361 n.15 (citing Report
of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, at 239).
132. See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (finding that extreme prejudice re-
suited from contacts between jurors and key prosecution witnesses during the trial); Rideau v. Lou-
isiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (finding that repeated televised coverage of defendant's confession made
fair trial impossible without change of venue).
133. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27.
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quent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such
a spectacle could be but a hollow formality.' 34
Similarly, in Turner v. Louisiana,35 the Supreme Court overturned a
conviction on the basis of presumed juror prejudice which was caused by
influences external to the trial evidence.'" Unlike the jury in Rideau, the
Turner jury panel was sequestered.' 3 On several occasions, however, the
panel was under the care of two deputy sheriffs who were also key
prosecution witnesses at Turner's trial.' 3' Though the deputies denied
discussing the case with the jury, the Court held that their continued
contact with the jurors during meals, and at other times throughout the
trial, allowed them to establish and renew acquaintances with the jurors
that would significantly enhance the jurors' perception of the deputies'
credibility as key witnesses in a trial where the defendant received a
death sentence.'39
The Court noted that the jury verdict must be based on evidence
developed at trial, and observed that the credibility of key witnesses was
an integral part of that evidence.'" The Court stated, "Any judge who has
sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms they are extremely likely to
be impregnated by the environing atmosphere."'' The Court concluded
that, notwithstanding the deputies' assurance that they had not discussed
the case directly with the jury, "it would be blinking reality not to recog-
nize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association through-
out the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the
prosecution."'4 " The Court reversed Turner's conviction even though no
actual prejudice had been shown, noting that his "fate depended upon
how much confidence the jury placed in these two witnesses."'4 "
In contrast to Rideau, the Turner case did not involve media influ-
ence on jurors or the venire. " Nonetheless, the Court's conclusion in
Turner, that bias could be presumed, demonstrated its sensitivity to ex-
ternal influences on jurors. Moreover, among external influences, the
Court has indicated that the media is among the most suspect and perva-
134. Id. at 726.
135. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
136. Turner, 379 U.S. at 474.
137. Id. at 467.
138. Id. at 469.
139. Id. at 473-74.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 472 (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
The Court, citing Rideau, noted that external influence may have rendered the courtroom proceed-
ings hollow. Id. at 473.
142. Id.at:473.
143. Id. at 474.
144. Id. at 467-70.
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sive.45 Therefore, the existence of media-based influence on the jury or
the venire resulting from information, or other influences which are not
part of proper evidentiary development in court, could play a significant
role in a defendant's assertion of denial of due process."
2. The Existence of a Community Pattern of Thought or Unified
Opinion Among Members of the Venire
The existence of a widespread opinion among the members of the
community from which the jurors will be selected has, on several occa-
sions, been a significant factor in the Court's analysis of undue jury
bias.' 7 The Court has said that the impaneling of impartial, "indifferent"
jurors is essential to protecting the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial."6 The necessity of "indifferent" jurors may be traced
to the oft quoted words of Lord Coke, who stated that the fair juror must
be as "indifferent as he stands unsworn."'' 9 Over the years, courts have
used differing terms to describe the hazards arising from a lack of indif-
ference within a community. The underlying concern, however, has con-
sistently been the need for impartial jurors." In Irvin v. Dowd, the Court,
while assessing defendant's claim of juror bias, referred to the "commu-
nity pattern of thought" existing in the area from which the jurors were
selected. "' The Court noted that this demonstrated "a pattern of deep and
bitter prejudice against the [defendant],"'5 2 and held that, under these cir-
145. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965). The Court stated that "[tielevision in
its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice
to an accused." Id. Of greatest significance was "[t]he potential impact of television on the jurors."
Id. at 545.
146. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356-57 (1966) (finding that although broadcast
material was not presented as evidence at trial, it undoubtedly reached the jury); Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (emphasizing the prospective jurors' repeated exposure to a broadcast
film of the defendant's irregular confession).
147. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351; Estes,
381 U.S. at 545; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
148. See Turner, 379 U.S. at 471-72 (the right to a jury trial requires a trial by a panel of indif-
ferent jurors, cited in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-73 (1948)); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (stating that
"the right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
'indifferent' jurors"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (holding that the defendant has the
right to have an impartial judge, regardless of the evidence against him).
149. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799; Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505,509 (1971); Turner, 379
U.S. at 472, Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (quoting EDWARD COKE, 1 INSTrrUTE OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND
155a (1853)).
150. See, e.g., Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803 ("[T]o select jurors who appear to be impartial is .. . [a]
factor relevant in evaluating [the] jurors' assurances of impartiality."); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 724-25
(stating that "[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception").
151. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725; see also Rideau, 373 U.S. at 731 (Clark, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Clark compared the circumstances surrounding Rideau's trial with those in Irvin. He
characterized Irvin as a case involving media coverage causing "complete permeation, imbedding
opinions of guilt in the minds of 90% of the veniremen . I... d.
152. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727. The Court cited newspaper reports of uniform community bias,
noting that the voir dire record revealed that 90% of the prospective jurors had indicated some opin-
ion of guilt, as did two-thirds of the impaneled jurors. Id.
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cumstances, a finding that the jurors were impartial did not meet consti-
tutional standards.' 3 Though the Irvin Court did not hold that bias could
be presumed, it easily discounted the jurors' oaths, and other indications
of impartiality.
4
In Estes v. Texas'55 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,'" the existence of a
community pattern of thought was a significant factor in the Court's
holding that juror bias, and its accompanying denial of due process,
could be presumed.'57 The Estes Court indicated the presence and poten-
tial hazards of a community pattern of thought, noting that "intense pub-
lic feeling" created by pretrial publicity is aggravated when jurors realize
they must return to a community "hostile to an accused."'5 8 In Sheppard,
the Court quoted Irvin, stating that an accused was entitled to be "tried in
an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion .... "'"
The Supreme Court has discussed the concept and impact of com-
munity opinion or patterns of thought in the context of trials being de-
cided on the basis of evidence presented in court, free of external influ-
ences."' It is also significant, however, when considering the likelihood
that prospective jurors will mirror the widespread opinions of the com-
munity.
161
3. Widespread Media Coverage and Replay of an Alleged or Ac-
tual Confession by the Defend'ant
Rideau v. Louisiana 16 is a landmark opinion. It is the first time the
Supreme Court ruled that media coverage of pretrial events could so bias
the venire that a jury selected from that venire would deny the defendant
a fair trial, without demonstrating actual bias among the empanelled ju-
rors.'63 Critical to the Court's finding of a due process violation was the
153. Id. at 728.
154. Id. The Court dismissed jurors' statements that, notwithstanding their opinions, they would
be fair and impartial in their deliberations, stating, "Where so many, so many times, admitted preju-
dice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight."Id.
155. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
156. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
157. See supra notes 15, 108 and accompanying text.
158. Estes, 381 U.S. at 545.
159. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728).
160. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (requiring that "the jury's verdict be based on evi-
dence received in open court, not from outside sources"); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725 (noting the existence
of a community bias or pattern of thought as proof of prejudice).
161. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
162. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
163. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27. The Court stated:
[We do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the
voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due process of law in this case re-
quired a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and
heard Rideau's televised 'interview.'
Id. at 727. In his dissent, Justice Clark condemned the majority opinion for failing to establish "any
substantial nexus between the televised 'interview' and petitioner's trial . I... "d  at 729.
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fact that the venire "had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the
spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with
which he was later to be charged."''
The broadcast of a confession has been a significant issue in other
cases'65 when the Supreme Court has held media coverage of trial events
resulted in a denial of due process." With the exception of its significant
weight in Rideau, however, this factor alone has not been enough to
carry the charge of juror bias and has sometimes existed in cases where
convictions were upheld.'
6'
4. The Media Circus: Denial, Due to Media Attention, of a Defen-
dant's Privilege to Have Judicial Serenity, or Calmness and So-
lemnity, in the Courtroom
The Supreme Court has frequently expressed its position that, to be
proper and fair, a trial must be conducted in an atmosphere of calmness
and solemnity.'" Consistent with that position, the Court has expressed
concern that the presence of the media in or around the courtroom might
disrupt or destroy the solemn air needed for a fair trial.'" The Court has
taken a strong position that due process is in jeopardy when the media's
presence causes the solemnity of the courtroom to deteriorate to a media
circus or "Roman holiday."'"7 Indeed, in the three pivotal cases where the
Supreme Court ruled that juror bias could be presumed without proof of
actual bias, the Court noted that media coverage had somehow infringed
on the proper air of the trial proceeding."'
The Supreme Court's bristly reaction to the media in these 1960s
era cases was apparently not attributable to the relative newness of tele-
164. Id. at 726. The Court stated that, following the spectacle, the trial would be no more than a
"hollow formality." Id.
165. See, e.g., Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727.
166. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-28 (describing the effect of broadcasting defendant's
irregular confession).
167. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194, 198 (1952) (affirming defendant's convic-
tion, notwithstanding his aired confession).
168. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (entitling the defendant to "judicial
serenity and calm"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that
"calmness and solemnity of the courtroom" is necessary for proper adjudication); Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1878) (finding that the "exercise of calm and informed judgment [by the
jury] is essential to proper enforcement of the law").
169. Cox, 379 U.S. at 583 (stating that freedom of discussion should not be allowed to hamper
the solemnity of the courtroom); see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of calmness to the proper enforcement of the law).
170. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355-58 (1966). In discussing the trial atmosphere, the
Court in Sheppard characterized it with terms like "bedlam reigned," "Roman holiday," and "carmi-
val atmosphere." Id. The Court recounted nine examples of what it called "flagrant episodes of
pretrial and trial publicity." Id. at 345-49; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 549 (stating that the defendant
is "entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena"); Rideau, 373 U.S. at
726 (referring to pretrial media coverage as a "spectacle").
171. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 355-58; Estes, 381 U.S. at 549; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726.
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vision coverage of trials.' 2 It is not surprising, therefore, that after many
years, the media circus still seems to raise the ire of the courts.' Perhaps
this is where judges can more clearly see a need, and exercise the power,
to restrict the media without impinging on its First Amendment rights.'
74
Historically, the courts have distinguished between the press's right to
report versus its right to influence trial proceedings, and have no reluc-
tance prohibiting the latter, stating that interference is not a protected
right.'75 The lesson is that a media circus, which likely contains attributes
of other critical factors discussed above, may be the factor that triggers-
at minimum-the acknowledgment that prejudice to the venire may oc-
cur.
5. Media Saturation of the Venire with Prejudicial Pretrial
Publicity
In addition to focusing on the nature and content of the publicity
and the behavior of the press in reporting trial events, courts have con-
sidered the sheer amount of pretrial coverage to be a significant factor in
finding presumed bias.' 6 The Supreme Court has described saturation
press coverage in terms that indicate the frequency and number of the
reports.'" The Court has also described saturation in terms of the percent-
age of households in the venire which received the prejudicial
coverage.' The courts have considered saturation in conjunction with
other factors to conclude that prejudice to the venire could be
presumed.
172. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 541 (indicating that the Court's reservations about broadcasting
trials were not attributable to the newness of television, but rather its potential to impact the admini-
stration of justice); Douglas, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that the photographing or broadcasting of
trials "is not dangerous because it is new" but "dangerous because of the insidious influences which
it puts to work in the administration of justice").
173. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1491-1537 (1lth Cir. 1985).
174. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357-59 (disagreeing with the trial judge's perceived lack
of power to control trial publicity, and giving several measures the judge should have taken to limit
the press's presence). The Court found that the judge should have warned reporters against publish-
ing materials not introduced at the proceedings. Id. at 362. This would have given added protection
to the defendant's fight to a fair trial without further restricting the news media. Id.
175. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 349-51; Estes, 381 U.S. at 538-39.
176. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357; Estes, 381 U.S. at 538; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 725; Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1490.
177. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 538 (describing the coverage as a "bombardment of the com-
munity"); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725 (describing a "barrage of newspaper headlines, articles..
178. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
179. Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1490 (considering whether pretrial publicity is sufficiently prejudi-
cial and inflammatory).
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B. Why the Sum of Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard Equals a Criminal De-
fendant Without a Jury
Though Justice Douglas may have seemed like an alarmist in
1960,'" following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rideau, we might
envision circumstances in which a criminal defendant could claim a due
process violation based on jury bias, before voir dire, that could not be
corrected.'8 ' Under Rideau and its progeny, the Court has considered and
evaluated the nature, content, and extent of saturation of the media cov-
erage of the defendant's case.'82 Once the coverage reached a certain
level, juror bias against the defendant was presumed.'83 Thus, no proof of
actual bias was necessary in order for the defendant's conviction to be
overturned. '" Indeed, in some cases, no nexus between the coverage and
bias was even evaluated.' Therefore, there existed what can be inter-
preted as a dual presumption." First, at a certain level of media cover-
age, it was presumed that all members of the particular venire had been
exposed to the prejudicial publicity.'" Second, presumed bias was the
result of presumed exposure.' The conclusion stemming from these pre-
sumptions was that due process had been denied.'89 The sum of these
180. Douglas, supra note 1; see also infra note 310 and accompanying text.
181. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *16. This was precisely the claim
made by Timothy McVeigh's attorneys during a review of questionnaires received from members of
the venire, prior to their live voir dire. Id. at *9-12.
182. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963); see also supra note 163 and accompa-
nying text.
183. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353-55 (1966) (coverage consisted of extensive
newspaper, radio and television broadcasts of the trial, in addition to a live inquest of Sheppard
televised at a high school gymnasium, which seated hundreds of people); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 536, 554 (1965) (coverage consisted of live radio and television broadcasts, news photographs,
cameramen taking live and still pictures during the proceedings, and microphones on the judge's
bench); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 725, 727 (coverage included a local televised broadcast of the jailed
defendant, who admitted details of the commission of robbery, kidnaping and murder in the presence
of the sheriff and two state troopers).
184. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 (showing of actual prejudice is not necessary for the court
to reverse); id. at 613 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that "there is no indication anywhere in the
record of any disturbance whatever of the judicial proceeding").
185. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), and
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 729 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). But see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1961) (explaining the community pattern
of thought that resulted from the extensive media coverage).
186. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 442 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recog-
nizing the apparent or potential existence of a dual existence of a dual presumption in Irvin, though
the Irvin decision ultimately rests on the existence of actual, not presumed, bias). See Irvin, 366 U.S.
at 723-24,727-28.
187. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 719-20.
188. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 442 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (interpreting Irvin as standing
for the proposition that a community exposed to unrelenting publicity is presumed prejudiced,
thereby entitling the defendant to a new trial); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727 (holding that the process
required selecting a jury from a community that had not been exposed to certain pretrial publicity).
189. Estes, 381 U.S. at 543 (1965) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), and Turney v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), for the proposition that, at times, a state may engage in procedures that
result in prejudice, which are inherently lacking in due process).
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presumptions in a case attracting the requisite amount of national pretrial
publicity would arguably equal a presumption that the entire nation had
witnessed the coverage and was thereby prejudiced.
Though the Supreme Court has paid little more than lip service to
the presumed bias standard since Murphy v. Florida, there is some re-
search that supports the presumed bias standard. For example, significant
research confirms that negative media coverage taints a juror's percep-
tion against the defendant."w Moreover, the authors of one study found
that only by delaying the trial could they obtain any statistically signifi-
cant reduction in the impact of some types of negative coverage."' This
research conflicts with court holdings that bias can be overcome by juror
voir dire or jury instruction.'" However, the courts' focus on assessing
the amount of bias affecting individual jurors may be the answer to
claims of nationwide juror bias, because finding impartial jurors through
individual voir dire would be the best response to allegations of pre-
sumed, rather than actual, bias. Moreover, focusing on the individual
jurors better addresses the problem of prejudicial media coverage, which
frequently occurs before the trial begins, or, indeed, as the crime itself is
reported.'93 Conversely, limiting pretrial and trial coverage in an effort to
190. Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAw
& HuM. BEHAV. 453 (1994). These authors conducted a survey of 262 psychology students to test
the differential impact of several types of pretrial publicity on decision making in a trial simulation,
both before and after the subjects viewed the trial, and to determine whether the evidence presented
at trial would have the effect of either accenting or diminishing the negative impact of pretrial pub-
licity. Id. at 464. The study found that negative character publicity about the defendant had the
greatest effect on initial judgment. Id. The authors concluded that trial evidence generally reduces
the effects of pretrial publicity manipulations on the final verdict. Id. at 465; see John S. Carroll et
al., Free Press and Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 187
(1986). The authors cited studies, including one by Constantini and King, which indicated that
respondents with greater knowledge about a case were more likely to be pro-prosecution. Id. at 191.
The more media sources a respondent accessed, the greater his or her knowledge of the case. Id.
Pretrial knowledge was the best predictor of prejudgment, and was relatively independent of other
attitudinal and demographic predictors of case bias. Id. The authors further noted that attempts to
relate publicity to actual verdicts are more difficult than attempts to show prejudice in the public.Id.
191. Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW &
HuM. BE-AV. 409 (1990). The authors suggest that a continuance of several days between exposure
to publicity and viewing the trial effectively remedies factual publicity (containing incriminating
information about the defendant), but not emotional publicity (containing information arousing
negative emotions, but not incriminating information). Id. The authors found that judicial instruc-
tions not to base verdicts on the news were minimally effective, especially in highly emotional or
heinous cases. Id. at 413. But see Carroll et al., supra note 190, at 192 (finding judges, prosecutors,
and reporters generally of the opinion that existing remedies work, including jury instruction, se-
questration, continuation, additional preemptory challenges, and gag orders). Judges believe voir
dire to be an effective remedy for news coverage, and the authors seem to agree. Id. at 192, 197.
192. For examples of cases where the Court found that voir dire or jury instructions could
overcome bias, see Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1991), Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.
1025, 1038-39 (1984), and Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1290-91 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
193. See Minow & Cate, supra note 121, at 633 (noting that an impediment to judicial control
over media reporting of information related to a case is the fact that "increasingly, the most dramatic
revelations occur at the time of the crime itself, long before there is a trial, much less a judge se-
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address the prejudicial impact of prior media coverage of the crime in
progress is akin to slamming the barn door behind the escaping horse.
Courts applying the presumed prejudice standard have held that a
trial before a jury selected from the adversely affected venire is void.'94
The arguable consequences of a defendant establishing that the affected
venire is the entire nation of potential jurors would be dismissal of the
criminal prosecution'9 or extended delay of the trial to abate the impact
of adverse media coverage.'" Most recently, the attorneys for convicted
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, took this position in seeking
to dismiss charges against him following the publication of his alleged
confession.'97 The main argument presented in McVeigh's motion was
that pretrial publicity was so devastating, prejudicial, and widespread
that there was no reasonable possibility that the defendant could receive
a fair trial. His indictment, therefore, should be dismissed.'98 The motion
lected to oversee the trial"). In Estes, Sheppard, Rideau, and other cases, the damaging prejudicial
reporting occurred before jury selection. In Sheppard, the defendant was convicted for the second-
degree murder of his wife. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966). Pretrial publicity con-
sisted of newspaper articles emphasizing the defendant's guilt, capitalizing on the defendant's affair
with another woman, and delving into the defendant's personal life. Id. at 340-42. The newspaper
clippings alone filled five volumes, and there were radio and television broadcasts. Id. at 342. In
Estes, the defendant was convicted for swindling. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534 (1965). Pretrial
publicity included radio and television broadcasts, and live news photographs. Id. at 533-36. At the
defendant's pretrial hearing, all the seats in the courtroom were filled, with at least twelve camera-
men present at all times to take motion and still pictures. Id. Pretrial publicity totaled eleven volumes
of press clippings. Id. at 535. In Rideau, the defendant was convicted for the murder of a bank em-
ployee. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963). The pretrial publicity consisted of three
television broadcasts of the defendant's "interview" with the sheriff. Id. at 724. In these "inter-
views," the defendant admitted in detail to committing robbery, kidnaping, and murder. Id. at 725.
194. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that prejudice could be presumed, since the small community was so overwhelmed and saturated
with pervasive pretrial publicity).
195. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *5. The motion argues that the defense
seems like a lie "at worst," when jurors hear negative opinions and commentary in the press, and
then hear a different story from the defense at trial. The "real trial" has already occurred with poten-
tial juror exposure to purported confessions; the defense can do nothing more than "score debater's
points." Id. Because the entire nation had been exposed to the negative publicity, arguably due
process could not be obtained, thus counsel argued that the case should be dismissed. Id. at *10-11;
see also United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995) (presuming prejudice when the
court determines that jurors had watched news reports of a trial).
196. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *13 (arguing that a substantial continu-
ance will make the details of the publicity less memorable). According to defense counsel, "[a]
continuance is [the] favored remedy when the prejudicial publicity complained of will abate within a
foreseeable period." Id. at *14 (citing United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1987));
see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952) (holding that a new trial was the
remedy for failure to grant a continuance because a change in venue would not have provided relief
for national publicity).
197. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *1. According to the newspaper, it had
lawfully obtained internal defense documents in which Timothy McVeigh confessed to his defense
team that he alone bombed the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and that he did so
during the day because he needed a "body count" in order to make his point to the government. Id. at
*3.
198. Id. at *9-12.
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began by describing the prejudicial publicity, which started with a Dallas
Morning News story.
On February 28, 1997, thirty-one days before trial was scheduled to
begin, the Dallas Morning News published an article on its Internet home
page which stated that the defendant, Timothy McVeigh, had confessed
to a defense team member that he had driven the truck containing explo-
sives to the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and detonated
the explosives.'" This article immediately sparked additional stories
about the McVeigh "confession."2' The defendant contended that publi-
cation of his "confession" harmed him because it "violat[ed] the sanctu-
ary of the attorney-client privilege""2 ' and eviscerated "[his] right to plead
not guilty."' Furthermore, the defendant emphasized that because of the
extensive publicity given to this "confession," any doubt about his guilt
based on the evidence at trial would "invariably be resolved against
[him] .... 203
Next, the defendant presented his main argument, namely that the
indictment should be dismissed because the prejudicial, inflammatory,
pretrial publicity destroyed any reasonable possibility that he could re-
ceive a fair trial anywhere in the nation. ' As support for this argument,
he relied on the cornerstones of our criminal justice system-the pre-
sumption of innocence, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair
trial.' Citing case law,"6 the defendant concluded that prejudice to him
199. Id. at *3. The trial was scheduled to begin on March 31, 1997. Id. The article also cited
"confidential defense documents" which were "obtained legally." Id.
200. Following the Dallas Morning News story, publicity included televised stories about the
alleged "confession," newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts relaying the "confession." Id. at *4.
Moreover, the Dallas Morning News story triggered a similar story on Playboy magazine's Internet
home page, and, in turn, interviews of its author, Mr. Ben Fenwick, on all three major television
networks. Id.
201. Id. at *5. The defendant stressed that the attorney-client relationship "is the central place
where counsel's assistance can be had--where there is a right to communicate without fear of the
consequences ..... Id. As a result of the numerous publications of McVeigh's "confession," the
defendant contended that Dallas Morning News and Playboy had intruded into the sacred attorney-
client relationship because they were not "invited" in by the accused; thus, they were trespassers. Id.
at *2.
202. Id. at *5. Although the defendant acknowledged that he could still plead not guilty, he
emphasized that jurors cannot simply be uninfluenced by the content of the publicized stories, re-
gardless of whether they honestly believe they can listen and evaluate the evidence at trial without
considering the pretrial disclosures. Id.
203. See id. at *6.
204. See id. at *9-12.
205. Id. McVeigh bases his argument on the idea that to presume innocence, jurors must lay
aside all suspicion and the conclusions they have formed in order to reach their final conclusion
solely on legal evidence. See id. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
206. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (presuming prejudice when defendant's
confession was televised prior to trial); United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995)
(presuming prejudice when jurors had watched television reports prior to trial).
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was presumed.' Finally, in the alternative, he moved that the court abate
his trial for at least one year to allow the lethal effects of prejudicial and
inflammatory publicity to subside, in order to assure him of his constitu-
tional rights.'
The court denied McVeigh's motion on the basis that it did not "ac-
cept the assumptions necessary to support the defense position .... "
The court concluded, noting past experience with jurors and general
awareness of public attitudes but without referring to specific content or
amount of media coverage, that the stories about McVeigh's alleged con-
fession lacked the impact necessary to create the alleged type and mag-
nitude of bias to the venire." ° The court acknowledged that the pretrial
proceedings had been extensively reported and furthermore, that the fu-
ture coverage could be expected to increasingly slant toward the sensa-
tional aspects of the trial as the media competed for public attention. "' In
so concluding, the court did not address the impact and implications of
an alleged confession on the venire that, according to McVeigh's
motion,"' the Court considered to be a critical issue in Irvin"3 and Ri-
deau."
While the court addressed the issue of foundational and fundamental
fairness with respect to the defendant's trial, it concluded that such fair-
ness could be protected by the skill of the defense attorneys, pretrial
measures by the court, and the voir dire process for the jury panel.25 The
court found that "there is no reason to believe that fair-minded persons
would be so influenced by anything contained in this recent publicity that
they would not be ready, willing, and able to perform the duty to follow
the law and decide according to the evidence presented in a vigorously
contested trial. 2 6 Apparently the court attributed this ability to jurors,
notwithstanding the coverage of McVeigh's alleged confession, because
of a presumed "healthy skepticism about what they are told."2 7
207. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *10.
208. Id. at *12-15. The motion stated that "fo]nly with a substantial, meaningful continuance
will recall fade to the point where a fair trial may become possible." Id. at *14. The motion esti-
mated that one year would probably be sufficient for memories about the reports to become less
specific, and would allow jurors the ability to listen without thoughts clouded by improper, inflam-
matory information. Id.
209. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *1.
210. Id. Chief Judge Matsch of the U.S. District Court of Colorado stated that "(plast experi-
ence with jurors and a general awareness about pretrial publicity in criminal cases suggest that these
stories have had neither the wide exposure nor general acceptance that the defendant's lawyers
presume." Id.
211. Id.
212. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *11.
213. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,725-26 (1961).
214. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
215. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *2.
216. Id. at *3.
217. Id. at *2-3.
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Following the trial court's decision, McVeigh's attorneys filed a
petition for writ of prohibition with the Tenth Circuit, in essence appeal-
ing the court's ruling.28 The court of appeals denied the petition as pre-
mature,"9 and McVeigh proceeded to trial. At trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to death.2"
The actual and potential impact of media coverage on the judicial
system is notable in this case; a case which had already been transferred
to a different state to address the issue of statewide bias to potential ju-
rors."' Noteworthy is the fact that the bias existed prior to any trial pro-
ceedings, notwithstanding the fact that, because the trial was in federal
court, no cameras were permitted in any of the pretrial proceedings.' In
transferring the case from Oklahoma to Colorado, the federal court ac-
knowledged that McVeigh could not receive a fair trial anywhere in the
original forum state.' Yet, when national juror bias became the issue, the
district court and the court of appeals made quick work of disposing of
McVeigh's claims. For its part, the court of appeals held that McVeigh
must await the outcome of voir dire." ' This essentially eliminated the
presumed bias analysis of Rideau and led to the court's review of
McVeigh's arguments under an Irvin or Mu'Min type of analysis, where
proof of bias to the actual jurors is at issue.2" If the "totality of circum-
stances" test was confined to applying specific critical elements, like the
classic factors cited in Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, and if proving
the existence of those factors was sufficient to presume bias, the court
218. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 11, at *1.
219. See Order, supra note 12, at *1. The court stated that, though delay and an unnecessary
trial might result, the relief sought could be obtained through direct appeal following final judgment.
Id. It also deferred to the trial judge and voir dire for a determination of whether the alleged unfair
pretrial publicity was merely speculation or "demonstrable reality," citing United States v. Halde-
man, 559 F.2d 31, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Id.
220. Defendant McVeigh's Motion for New Trial, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and
Memorandum in Support at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 403417 (D.
Colo. July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion for New Trial].
221. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *1. According to Judge Matsch, the court
changed venue from Oklahoma to Colorado because the entire state of Oklahoma had become a
unified community that shared the emotional trauma of those who had been victimized. ld.
222. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "Mhe taking of photographs in
the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial pro-
ceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the court." FED. R. ClaM. P. 53; see also
United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (finding that existing bias
was sufficient to warrant a change of venue nearly six weeks before the beginning of the trial). The
court ordered the transfer of trial on February 19, 1996. Id. at 1475. It was scheduled to proceed on
March 31, 1996. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *3.
223. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. at 1473-74 (stating that the extensive publicity which evoked
strong emotional responses from those living in the united community of Oklahoma City presented
so great a prejudice to the defendant that a change of venue to Denver, Colorado was appropriate).
224. Order, supra note 12, at * i.
225. McVeigh's argument used a Rideau-type analysis, claiming that, due to media coverage of
his confession, bias could be presumed without reference to voir dire. The court of appeals ruled
against that position, stating that voir dire testimony would be used to prove individual juror bias. Id.
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could have been painted into a comer by the McVeigh motion and forced
to choose between setting him free, or denying him his constitutional
right to an unbiased jury. The court, however, was spared this dilemma,
because the "totality of circumstances" test under Murphy is flexible
enough to defeat virtually any claim of presumed national bias.
IV. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST HAS BECOME A GELATIN-
LIKE STANDARD GIVING WAY TO THE DON'T ASK-DON'T TELL
STANDARD OF MU'MIN
In adopting the "totality of the circumstances" test, courts have re-
jected the use of specific limited elements-the classic factors-of pre-
trial publicity when wrestling with conflicting First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights."2 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's posi-
tion that measuring the attitudes which underlie strong opinions is not
subject to any particular test.2" The Supreme Court has also noted that
generalizations with respect to attitudes of bias are not profitable because
each case must turn on special facts which are unique to each case." As
a result, the "totality of circumstances" test has only the appearance of a
firm standard.
A. The Gelatin-Like Standard
After Murphy, the "totality of the circumstances" test can be
viewed as the Court's Jell-O" remedy for the unknown future of pretrial
publicity. Like Jell-O, it appears solid in that it requires a court, in evalu-
ating the impact of pretrial publicity on a defendant's due process rights,
to look "to any indications in the totality of the circumstances that peti-
tioners' trial was not fundamentally fair."" Yet because the test grants
the Court discretion to rule based on individual factors in each case, like
Jell-O, it wiggles or changes when a defendant attempts to grab hold of
an opinion as precedent.' Each new case presents, in "totality," a new
226. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,724-25 (1961).
227. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936) ("Impartiality is not a technical
conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indiffer-
ence, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula.").
228. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959); see also, e.g., McVeigh, 918 F. Supp.
at 1473 ("The possible prejudicial impact of this type of publicity is not something measurable by
any objective standards."). The court noted that determination of juror prejudice was not subject to
"scientific methodology" or "laboratory experiments," and indeed part of the genius of the American
jury system was the presence of so many variables, such that no two trials could be compared, re-
gardless of their apparent similarities. Id.
229. See WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 648 (9th ed. 1986) (defining "Jell-
0" as a trademark for a gelatin dessert usually having the flavor and color of fruit).
230. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
231. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177
(1989). In discussing the totality of the circumstances test, Justice Scalia referred to it as a "discre-
tion-conferring approach," rather than one establishing a general rule of law. Id. To Scalia, this type
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set of circumstances. " Since the totality of circumstances, as opposed to
a predetermined set of factors, are determinative, any one factor from
prior cases and precedents may be discounted or offset by another."3
Justice Antonin Scalia, while providing an illustration of how the
test works, said, "Today we decide that these nine factors sustain recov-
ery. Whether only eight of them will do so-or whether the addition of a
tenth will change the outcome-are questions for another day.""' Criti-
cizing the test in certain applications, he stated, "When one is dealing, as
my Court often is, with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by one
side or the other to be resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not
greatly appeal to one's sense of justice to say: 'Well, that earlier case had
nine factors, this one has nine plus one."925
Scalia's criticism of the approach can be summarized as discomfort
with the lack of uniformity that a "totality of circumstances" test pro-
vides for legal decisions. This allows for inconsistent verdicts and a con-
clusion that there is "no single 'right' answer."' In the context of pretrial
publicity and especially in a McVeigh-type motion, however, it allows
the courts the luxury of continually moving the bar that a defendant must
hurdle to prove or establish a presumption of bias according to current
societal standards. " ' Under such a "totality of circumstances" test, the
level of media coverage needed to presume bias in 1966, when Sheppard
was decided, would never be sufficient in 1997, when McVeigh was de-
cided. So, while the McVeigh coverage exceeded that in Sheppard, other
factors that can be weighed in the totality of the circumstances might be
counted to offset the impact of publicity." Moreover, under the "totality
of circumstances" test, new circumstances can be added to the mix. 9 For
example, the magnitude of the coverage in the Simpson trial, combined
with the widespread dissatisfaction with the Simpson criminal verdict,
may be found to have conditioned the venire such that after Simpson,
prospective jurors would be skeptical about the media coverage of trials
of approach had the advantage in that "all generalizations (including, I know, the present one) are to




235. Id. at 1178.
236. Id. at 181.
237. See id. at 1188 (suggesting that even the rule of law may change over time). Justice Scalia
quotes Justice Cardozo, who stated that "[s]tandards of prudent conduct are declared at times by
courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life." Id.
238. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-32 (1984). The court of appeals, in focusing on
the factors in Irvin substantiating a finding of bias, failed to give adequate weight to factors pre-
sented in the case at bar that undercut, or diminished, the impact of the prejudicial publicity. ld.
239. Scaia, supra note 231, at 1178; see also infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), in which the Court, while comparing defendant's
circumstances to those in Irvin, considered that factors not address by Irvin mitigated the impact of
pretrial publicity in Mu'Min).
[Vol. 75:2
1998] FROM O. TO MCVEIGH
and, therefore, more receptive to actual trial evidence. This is confirmed,
at least in part, by poll results following the media coverage of the Simp-
son criminal pretrial events indicating that 86% of those surveyed said
they were more aware that media intrusion could affect a defendant's
ability to get a fair trial and 56% said they have less respect for the me-
dia.2"
B. The Demise of Presumed Bias? Alas Poor Rideau- Knew It Well
"Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in
this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy..
This quote, from Sheppard, sounds like it might have been a de-
scription of the O.J. Simpson case. Indeed, when comparing the Simpson
trial coverage with the coverage in Irvin, Rideau, Sheppard, and Estes,
every element of prejudicial pretrial publicity in those cases, except an
alleged confession, can be found in the Simpson coverage. 2 Then again,
none of these earlier cases contained footage so dramatic as the famous
"slow-speed car chase," which was seen by an estimated seventy million
television viewers.2'3 The McVeigh trial coverage, when compared to its
early predecessors, includes most of the classic elements, including the
coup de grace last-minute release of an alleged confession." When con-
240. See Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1980, 52, 54-55 (1994)
(listing Gallup Organization poll results).
241. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1966) (citing State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d
340, 342 (Ohio 1956)).
242. For discussion of the elements present in Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau v. Louisiana, Estes v.
Texas, and Sheppard v. Maxwell, see supra Part lII.A.
243. See Christopher B. Mueller, Introduction: OJ. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System
on Trial, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 727, 730 (1996); Burleigh, supra note 17, at 56 (estimating the num-
ber of people who watched the Los Angeles police pursuing Simpson at low speed on the freeway
just prior to his arrest).
244. McVeigh contended that extensive pretrial publicity essentially destroyed his right to a fair
trial. Specifically, he asserted that his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and against self-
incrimination were violated because the devastating "confessions" he made to his defense counsel
were so widely publicized. Defendant's Motion for New Trial, supra note 220, at * 1; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."). Pretrial publicity
consisted of extensive newspaper and electronic media coverage. Defendant's Motion for New Trial,
supra note 220, at *3. Newspaper coverage of the McVeigh "confession" began with the Dallas
Morning News' Intemet home page publication on February 28, 1997. Id. On March 1, the "confes-
sion" appeared in print media, after which the publicity continued relentlessly for eleven days. Id.
Following Playboy's home page reiteration of McVeigh's "confession," several newspapers carried
articles with headlines such as "McVeigh Wanted a Body Count," "Timothy McVeigh's Purported
Admission That He Committed the Oklahoma City Bombing May Be Inadmissible at His Trial ... "
and "Paper Suspect Timed Blast to Boost Deaths." Id. Television news coverage consisted of several
reports of McVeigh's "confession" carried by major networks such as ABC, CBS, and CNN. Id. at
*4. These were broadcast in the weeks before McVeigh's trial, from Febnrary 28 to March 12, 1997.
Id. Furthermore, the trial had the element of a consistent community pattern of thought, which re-
sulted in removal of the trial from Oklahoma City to Denver. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F.
Supp. 1467, 1471 (W.D. Okla. 1996). As the court noted, "Oklahomans are united as a family with a
spirit unique to the state." Id. at 1471.
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sidering the elements of media coverage in these cases, and comparing
them to Supreme Court precedent, one could draw the conclusion that,
following the lead of Sheppard, Irvin, Estes, or Rideau, a court could
easily sustain a finding that prejudicial pretrial publicity might deny
McVeigh or Simpson 5 .a fair trial." Moreover, because of the expansive
coverage of these two cases, as compared to other cases in recent
history," it is not a long stretch to argue that the prejudicial impact
would be nationwide.2" The natural result of combining these two factors
is the success of a motion like that made by McVeigh, which contended
that his entire prosecution should be dismissed for lack of a venue that
could supply an impartial jury.'4 9 It appears, however, in reviewing recent
precedents, that the Supreme Court has positioned itself to always be the
ringmaster at the media circus rather than the clown painted into a cor-
ner. It has done this by adopting the "totality of circumstances" test and
then applying the test in such a way that new factors and circumstances
continually change the mix necessary to prove or presume bias.'
For example, in Mu'Min, the Court considered not only the size of
the population, the saturation of the media coverage, the extent and con-
tent of the coverage, and the airing of the defendant's alleged confession,
but it also tossed in the number of murders in the area, and the fact that
the defendant's crime was only one of nine murders occurring that
245. Though Simpson was acquitted, his trial is relevant in terms of the publicity that it re-
ceived.
246. Compare Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 340, and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), with
Defendant's Motion for New Trial, supra note 220, and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The
newspaper coverage in Sheppard tended to emphasize the defendant's guilt, and pointed out discrep-
ancies in his statements to authorities. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 340. The Court granted defendant's
motion for a new trial, because of the massive pretrial publicity that had saturated the community,
the "carnival atmosphere of the courtroom," the failure to insulate the witnesses, and the lack of
effort by the court to control the flow of information to the press. Id. at 357-63. In Rideau, the de-
fendant's request for change of venue was granted because three televised interviews of the defen-
dant's "confession" had been broadcast within the community. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727-28. After
acknowledging the probability that tens of thousands of people watched the televised "confession,"
the Court stated that "subsequent court proceedings ... could be but a hollow formality." ld. at 726.
Pretrial publicity of McVeigh's "confession" received national coverage via television and even
world-wide coverage, due to publication on Internet home pages. Defendant's Motion for New Trial,
supra note 220, at *1-3. Finally, in Irvin, the defendant's conviction for murder was reversed be-
cause the Court found that despite a change of venue, the current community pattern of thought
revealed a deep and bitter prejudice. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725; see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545-50
(1965) (noting that the use of television does not contribute materially to ascertaining truth, but
rather impacts the opinions of jurors, impairs the quality of testimonies, places additional responsi-
bilities on the trial judge, and tends to harass the criminal defendant).
247. See Burleigh, supra note 17 (indicating that the coverage of the Simpson trial was unlike
any in history).
248. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 11.
249. Seeid.at*12.
250. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1991) (distinguishing the factors in
Mu'Min from those in Irvin).
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year."' Putting aside the life-cheapening implications of this analysis, it
suggests that with more murders, there is less sensitivity to a single mur-
der, and therefore less impact on the venire as a result of pretrial public-
ity directed at a single murder suspect."2 That same logic can be applied
to the media coverage itself. As the media creates bigger, more nation-
ally-saturating coverage (a bigger circus), the nation as part of the venire
is desensitized. Thus, after Simpson, the courts could arguably move the
bar for McVeigh, claiming that the Simpson coverage desensitized the
nation's media consumers to a point where they expect that level of cir-
cus atmosphere in trial coverage. This lack of sensitivity would undercut
a defendant's claim that the prospective jurors who received that cover-
age would be impacted by, or biased as a result of, having seen or heard
it.
Arguably, then, the presumed or inherent prejudice standard articu-
lated in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard could never be met again, or at least
could always be refuted by simply shifting the factors to be considered in
the totality of media coverage circumstances. For the courts, the beauty
of this is that there will never be national jury bias, and there will always
be a place to send the defendant for a fair trial with an "impartial" jury.2
3
With the presumed prejudice test out of the way, a court can focus on the
standards established in Mu'Min, which allow the judge to determine that
individual jurors are sufficiently impartial to be impaneled without a
specific inquiry into the types of pretrial publicity they encountered.'
This is also good for the media, which is less likely to be restrained if the
courts perceive that the defendant will receive a fair trial regardless of
the press coverage. While the effective elimination of presumed preju-
dice permits the courts and the media to evade the trap of national jury
bias, it leaves the nationally notorious, and even the locally notorious,
defendant at substantial risk of being denied a fair trial.
C. The Mu'Min Alternative--Don't Ask Don't Tell
In Mu'Min v. Virginia," the Court held that in criminal cases having
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the defendant does not have a constitutional
right to question the prospective jurors about the specific content of the
251. Id. at 429. The Court expanded this discussion to include the number of murders in the
surrounding area even though there was no indication that residents of that area were part of the
venire. Id.
252. Id.
253. This situation does not apply to state criminal defendants, who unlike McVeigh, cannot be
tried anywhere in the country under federal jurisdiction. This issue is unfortunately, but intention-
ally, omitted from this discussion.
254. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427 (acknowledging that prior cases have recognized the wide dis-
cretion granted to trial judges in conducting voir dire). The Court determined that despite the trial
judge's failure to question individual jurors about the content of the publicity they were exposed to,
the voir dire examination was sufficient to allow the court to select an impartial jury. Id. at 431-32.
255. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
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pretrial publicity they observed."6 The defendant in Mu'Min was a con-
victed murderer who was alleged to have robbed and killed a shop owner
after escaping from a prison work detail. 7 The case received substantial
news coverage due, in part, to the controversy surrounding allegations of
lax security on the work detail at the time of the murder." At trial, the
defendant asked the court to include several questions in voir dire about
the specific content of pretrial reports that the jurors had heard. 9 The
court denied the request, and conducted a voir dire of the general jury
panel, and jurors, in groups of four, but did not ask the jurors the content
questions the defendant had submitted.2" The jury convicted the defen-
dant and sentenced him to death.26' He then sought relief from the Su-
preme Court, claiming that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
had been denied."
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, stating that there
was no constitutional requirement that the trial court ask the specific
content voir dire questions submitted. 3 The Court noted that trial judges
have been given broad discretion in deciding how to conduct voir dire.2'
Reviewing its earlier decisions, it compared the judge's function during
voir dire to that of the jury during trial, stating "[b]oth must reach con-
clusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evalua-
tions of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.""
The Court acknowledged that content questions during voir dire
might be helpful to the trial court's assessment of juror impartiality.2" It
concluded, however, that to be constitutionally compelled, the failure to
ask the questions had to "render defendant's trial fundamentally
unfair.""' The Court quoted its opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, noting that in
that case, it had acknowledged that pretrial publicity can create such a
presumption of bias that jurors' claims of impartiality should not be be-
lieved.2' It even conceded that content questions might be constitution-
ally required if the media coverage of Mu'Min's trial had been equiva-
lent to that in Irvin.' The Court then distinguished the two cases, noting
differences in the magnitude of media coverage, and the sizes of the
256. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424-25.
257. Id. at 418.
258. Id. at 434-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at419.
260. Id. at 420.
261. Id. at 421.
262. Id. at 417.
263. Id. at 425.
264. Id. at 423.
265. Id. at 424 (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 425-26 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,799 (1975)).
268. Id. at 429 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)).
269. Id.
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communities in which the cases occurred.'m Though the Court concluded
that the Irvin coverage was more substantial, it considered factors never
discussed therein to support its conclusion that Mu'Min did not face the
"'wave of public passion"' that occurred in Irvin.27' For example, the
Court considered the fact that the murder in Mu'Min occurred in a large
metropolitan area where the defendant's case was only one of nine mur-
ders in the particular county, and one of hundreds in the metropolitan
area that year.27
One problem with the Court's analysis in Mu'Min is that a court has
the difficult task of determining a juror's individual sensitivity to pretrial
publicity. The impact on impartiality cannot be generalized."' In the
Court's estimation, there was insufficient media coverage in Mu'Min to
presume bias to the whole venire. That conclusion does not, however,
warrant the additional presumption of the absence of bias in any of the
individual jurors. In his dissent in Mu'Min, Justice Marshall put his fin-
ger on another problem when he stated that "an individual juror may
have an interest in concealing his own bias. .. [or] may be unaware of
it." ' Moreover, inquiry into the content of the media coverage an indi-
vidual juror was exposed to certainly ought to be required so the trial
court can check the believability and credibility of the juror's statement
of impartiality. The judge's task in evaluating juror bias is analogous to
what jurors do with respect to witness testimony during trial." 5 The
anomaly in the Supreme Court's subsequent conclusion that content
questions are not required is thus apparent when one considers a jury
panel having to evaluate a witness's credibility based on nothing more
than the witness's promise to tell the truth. Finally, jurors may honestly
believe they can be impartial 'because they do not fully understand the
implications of what impartiality entails."6 Only the trial judge would be
in a position, through questioning a juror, to recognize the juror's erro-
neous conclusion.
270. Id. at 429-30.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 429.
273. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1961) (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S.
123, 145-46 (1936)). The Court stated: "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays
down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula." Id.
274. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
275. Id. at 424.
276. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (recognizing that although jurors say they will be fair and impartial,
they cannot forget what they see and hear); see also Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that a prospective juror may be "confused" as to what constitutes impartiality). Justice
Marshall refers to the example of a juror who insisted she was impartial despite exposure to news
articles but who, upon further questioning, stated, "Well, we all know what she has done.., we all
know the girl went in and held up the bank and the policeman was shot there." Id. at 443 n.4.
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Notwithstanding the anomalies in the Court's reasoning, there are
several issues in the Mu'Min opinion that are particularly relevant in the
context of massive pretrial publicity creating national jury bias. First, the
Court never referred to the "totality of circumstances" test. Yet, it refer-
enced Murphy for the proposition that to be constitutionally deficient, the
failure to ask content questions must render the defendant's trial funda-
mentally unfair.' The Mu'Min Court failed to point out that, in Murphy,
the Court held that fundamental unfairness must be determined through
examining the totality of circumstances." The Court, however, in Mur-
phy applied the "totality of circumstances" test to determine that the de-
fendant's case was not one in which bias to all the veniremen could be
presumed without reference to voir dire." In contrast to Mu'Min, the
Court in Murphy then examined a detailed voir dire while acknowledging
that, if the circumstances warranted, the jurors' assurances of impartiality
would not be dispositive.2 "
Second, the Court distinguished Mu'Min from Irvin, noting that the
coverage in Irvin might have necessitated content questions before the
jury could pass constitutional standards of impartiality."' It introduced,
however, new factors not considered in Irvin.2 Moreover, the Court used
the magnitude of coverage in Irvin as a sort of litmus test for Mu'Min,
concluding that, because Mu'Min's coverage did not meet or exceed the
coverage in Irvin, no content questions were required.' This comparison
is a bit misplaced since in Irvin, the Court held that the magnitude of
coverage supported its conclusion that it should not trust the jurors'
statements regarding their ability to be impartial at the conclusion of voir
dire. ' The Court did not hold that, absent that magnitude of coverage,
only a general voir dire was needed.
Third, as previously noted, this freedom to move the bar in a totality
of circumstances analysis, as evidenced in Mu'Min, is the Supreme
Court's escape hatch from the comer of national jury bias. No case will
ever be identical to any of those in which bias was presumed without
reference to voir dire. If a case comes to the Court that looks similar,
such as the McVeigh case, the Court can simply introduce new factors,
such as more people, or number of murders per year, to undercut a pre-
sumed bias argument. If that fails, the Court can look to prior media cov-
erage and conclude that the current case did not have sufficient coverage
277. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 425-26 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,799 (1975)).
278. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
279. Id. at 800.
280. Id. at 800-01.
281. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 429.
282. Id. (including the number of murders in the area, and the fact that the defendant's crime
was one of only nine murders occurred in the jurisdiction that year).
283. Id.
284. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,728 (1961).
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to impact the venire. This presents the prospect that the Court could use
the Simpson criminal trial coverage as a future litmus test for bias-
producing coverage, given that the unprecedented (unsurpassable?) cov-
erage in that case did not prevent his acquittal.
Under the foregoing analysis, it may be concluded that presumed
bias as it was established in Rideau is dead. But the lessons learned in
Irvin should not be. There are times when media coverage may be insuf-
ficient to presume bias, but substantial enough to presume exposure to
media coverage and content that is inherently prejudicial. At that point,
content questions, if requested, should be obligatory because only
through that inquiry can the court determine whether the totality of cir-
cumstances to which an individual juror was exposed renders that juror
biased and, thereby, makes that juror's jury service a violation of the
defendant's constitutional fair trial rights.20
V. THE NEW RING MASTER AT THE MEDIA CIRCUS
In the current media atmosphere, high profile and otherwise curious
or unique trials are likely to attract a media "circus" or at least a "carni-
val. ' 2M Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, courts
should not sit by and juggle the constitutional rights of defendants whose
cases attract excessive attention. Some precedents, while still good law,
have the appearance of clowns when thrust into the spotlight of the con-
temporary media circus. Rideau supports the proposition that, under ex-
treme circumstances of media coverage, bias can be presumed to all who
witness the coverage.' Applying Rideau, if the entire nation witnessed
sufficiently damaging coverage, the defendant could paint a court into a
corner, allowing a McVeigh-type scenario to result in the dismissal of a
defendant's prosecution before voir dire of a single juror. Murphy, as
currently interpreted, converts the totality of circumstances test into a
juggling act-tossing in new circumstances and eliminating old ones,
like trading balls for bowling pins.' Mu'Min is the classic clown with a
bucket of confetti that everyone believes is water. With the standard of
285. This is also consistent with the interpretations some courts have adopted in applying
Mu'Min v. Virginia. See, for example, People v. Jendrzejewski, 197 WL 422515, at *2 (Mich. 1997)
(citing Mu'Min v. Virginia. 500 U.S. 415,442 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting), where the Court
concluded that Irvin presents a dual presumption: first, that a certain level of media coverage creates
a presumption of exposure and, second, that the exposure creates a presumption of bias. Id. Even
though the Court may now be able to undercut the second presumption through introduction of new
factors in the totatlity of circumstances, it is safe to presume that, at a certain level, media coverage
would reach every individual in the nation.
286. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (referring to the trial in Estes as being
conducted in a "circus atmosphere"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (referring to
the "carnival atmosphere at trial" created by the presence of the press); Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S.
723, 726 (1963) (referring to the proceedings in the case as "kangaroo court proceedings").
287. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963). The Rideau Court held that due proc-
ess required the defendant to be tried by a jury who had not witnessed his televised confession. Id.
288. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 425-26.
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presumed prejudice virtually eliminated, a trial court's reliance on the
jurors' statements that they can be impartial is sustainable even without
the detailed voir dire called for by other Supreme Court precedent. ' In
the circumstance of a media circus large enough to actually impact a
venire, Mu'Min tosses confetti, not water, on the flame of injustice by
allowing a court to seat jurors who could take their prejudices to the jury
room undetected by the filter of extended voir dire designed to identify
bias. '
The media circus that appears at so many trials these days needs a
ringmaster to balance the rights of the media and the accused. It does not
need more clowns. Some suggest that the court should take control of the
spectacle."' Indeed, the court in McVeigh was quite aggressive and suc-
cessful in its efforts to control the circus.' Notwithstanding the precau-
tions the court took in pretrial, however, a single media event spiraled
into a spectacle that threatened or, according to McVeigh, destroyed the
defendant's chance for a fair trial. 3 Moreover, the Simpson trial demon-
strated that a big enough circus can turn even a competent, respected
judge into a performer in center ring. Judge Ito was not the first judge to
beoverwhelmed by the media onslaught, as other judges have appeared,
or felt, powerless to restrain the press."4
The release of the alleged confession in the McVeigh trial demon-
strated the explosive potential of pretrial coverage, even under controlled
circumstances." Indeed, McVeigh's defense counsel complimented the
manner in which the court had managed the pretrial and minimized the
impact of the publicity prior to the confession incident.' Unfortunately,
such media incidents in high visibility trials cannot be anticipated or
289. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (resolving any questions of juror impar-
tiality through an extensive voir dire); cf Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431 (holding that due process does
not require jurors to be asked specifically about their exposure to pretrial publicity).
290. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing
to fault the trial judge's decision to seat jurors without first inquiring into their exposure to public-
ity).
291. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 14, at 78-84 (proposing that courts actively
restrain the press and lawyers, and close voir dire/trial proceedings); Whitebread & Contreras, supra
note 15, at 1619-25 (proposing that courts impose a gag order on all trial participants, and utilize a
voir dire patterned after the considerations discussed in Mu'Min).
292. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1996) (prohibiting extra-
judicial statements to the press by attorneys, support personnel, persons associated with attorneys,
and court personnel).
293. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *9.
294. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-59 (1966) (noting that the trial court's fun-
damental error was compounded by the judge, who held that he could not control or restrict the
prejudicial pretrial coverage).
295. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *3-5 (describing the extensive media
coverage of the alleged confession that the Dallas Morning News published a month before the
scheduled commencement of trial).
296. Id. at *3 (noting that the court had gone to great lengths to balance free press and fair trial
rights).
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controlled. Therefore, the ultimate ringmaster would be a precedent that
provides the trial court with solid guidance and allows the court to bal-
ance the competing interests of the press and the accused, even after an
uncontrollable media outburst appears to make a fair trial impossible.
This article suggests that the Court already has the necessary precedent
in the form of Irvin, as it was interpreted by the Court in Patton v.
Yount,' with a little help from Rideau, Estes, Sheppard, Murphy, and
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mu'Min. The net result would be a "totality
of circumstances" test that considers and evaluates the impact of media
coverage, and other circumstances, on each individual juror. The ration-
ale for applying the test in this manner, and the method for application,
can be found in the above mentioned precedents.
Starting with the Court's interpretation of Irvin is unconventional
because, in Patton, the Court appeared to put it out to pasture.' The
Court's reference to the Irvin decision as "a leading one at the time" in-
dicates its perception that the decision was past its prime.m The Court
read the holding in Irvin to say "that adverse pretrial publicity can create
such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims
that they can be impartial should not be believed." The Court also
noted that, in Irvin, a number of factors had been reviewed to determine
whether the totality of circumstances raised such a presumption. °' This
reading of Irvin indicates that the Court in Patton believed that the for-
mer case had reviewed the totality of circumstances to evaluate presumed
bias to the community, which was sufficient to undercut an individual
juror's statement of impartiality. This reading requires that, when a case
is accompanied by a certain level of pretrial publicity, the court cannot
believe the juror's statements of impartiality. Rather, it must make the
determination of juror ,bias based on the totality of circumstances en-
countered by the juror.'
Here is where Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard enter the analysis. The
court's initial inquiry should be guided by the critical factors identified
by the Supreme Court in those cases. 3 If the pretrial publicity contains
297. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-35 (1984) (stating that the court of appeals, in
relying on Irvin, failed to consider other significant factors).




302. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). The Court imposed on the defendant the
burden of proving bias, and stating that
Unless [defendant] shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror
as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside... If
a positive and decided opinion had been formed, [the juror] would have been incompetent
even though it had not been expressed.
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)).
303. See supra Part II.A.
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these factors,' as Justice Marshall suggested, the court should be re-
quired to engage in detailed individual voir dire of the prospective jurors,
which would include questions about the content of publicity
witnessed.' At that point, nonclassic elements can be considered in the
totality of circumstances, such as whether the case arises in a community
that is more or less likely to be sensitive to, and thereby biased against, a
particular kind of crime or defendant.' This two-step inquiry serves two
purposes. First, it sorts out the source and strength of attitudes that assist
in determining whether a juror can put aside impressions and render a
fair verdict.' This determination is for the judge, not the juror, to
make.' Second, in the event that the judge cannot find impartial jurors,
the information received may assist the decision to transfer or delay the
trial.
Applying this process has several benefits. It prevents the court
from getting painted into a comer because the presumption of bias to the
entire venire is, in effect, left to rest in peace. Simultaneously, it creates a
fixed set of standards for initial inquiry into bias, but allows the flexibil-
ity to deal with societal changes that impact the community composing
the venire. Finally, this two-step process requires content questions when
a certain level of pretrial coverage occurs, but not for every case that
makes the evening news. Thus, courts are not burdened in the way the
majority feared in Mu'Min,' but a defendant in a high publicity case is
not left to trust his fate to the superficial and unexamined promise of
impartiality by a potentially biased juror.
CONCLUSION
Courts have wrestled with the impact of pretrial publicity on local
prospective and empanelled jurors for nearly two hundred years."' In
retrospect, Justice Douglas sounded almost prophetic when he said,
Think, too, of the times when a community is thoroughly
aroused about some heinous crime-so aroused as to generate an at-
mosphere in which a fair trial cannot be had. Imagine what could
happen if the latent local passions were aroused through channels
304. The defendant would still have the burden of raising the issue of bias, and establishing the
presence of certain factors. Consistent with precedent, however, not all factors would be required.
Rather, the defendant would argue those which appear in his case.
305. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 441-47 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A number of
courts use content voir dire. See id. at 446. Under Mu'Min, however, content questioning in voir dire
is not required to preserve defendant's due process rights. Id. at 431-32.
306. See id. at 429.
307. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (1961).
308. See id. at 724; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
309. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 446 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's
claim that content questions would unduly burden trial courts).
310. See generally supra note 37.
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provided by radio and television. Then there might be no place to
which the trial could be transferred to protect the accused."'
Now, nearly forty years later, Douglas's words are timely when consid-
ering the McVeigh trial, which was moved to a different state on the basis
that the entire state of Oklahoma was considered a unified community in
terms of its bias against the bombing suspect."2
The McVeigh court's treatment of the Oklahoma City bombing's
media coverage demonstrates a shifting focus from local and regional
bias to a more expansive presumed statewide bias. 3 Is nationwide bias
far behind? Worse yet, what if nationwide bias already exists and is sim-
ply undetected? Consider again the Simpson criminal trial coverage.
What if, as Professor Allen suggested, the "citizens of the country" be-
lieved, as he did, what they saw in the media coverage of Simpson's trial,
and subscribe to the notion that procedural protection of the criminally
accused is just "political rhetoric" when the citizens believe the media
instead of the evidence?" If Professor Allen's view, that the citizens of
this nation believe Simpson is guilty, actually reflects national sentiment,
we may have already witnessed the arrival of media-based national jury
bias, but simply failed to recognize it behind the veil of Simpson's
criminal acquittal."'
It is difficult to imagine this diverse nation of prospective jurors
both unified and galvanized in their opinions about a defendant's guilt or
innocence. Yet the challenge to the nation's ability to remain impartial
while engulfed in the media circus has now been issued-and initially
answered with a conviction-in the McVeigh trial. Regardless of the
ultimate resolution in that case, we have not likely seen the last of the
criminal trial media circus. Thus, we have not likely seen the last allega-
tion of national jury bias, which, for the purpose of this research, raises
two questions. First, is a motion to dismiss a prosecution because pretrial
publicity tainted the national jury pool viable after the Simpson trial cov-
erage exceeded every prior trial spectacle? Second, has the Court antici-
pated a Simpson-like media circus and raised the bar so high that all me-
dia coverage will fall below the standards required by the Court's post-
311. Id.
312. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (finding, without
proof of actual juror bias, that media coverage of the Oklahoma City explosion was so comprehen-
sive and profound that- the defendants could not receive a fair and impartial trial anywhere in the
state).
313. See id. (focusing on statewide media-based bias).
314. Allen, supra note 21, at 990 (stating that the "citizens of the country" saw an obviously
guilty Simpson acquitted, and that these "citizens" believe constitutional protection is intended for
the falsely accused innocent, not the [media-convicted] guilty).
315. This conclusion would, according to one poll, necessarily exclude approximately 70% of
black and 30% of white people from Professor Allen's definition of "citizen." Burleigh, supra note
17, at 61 (noting poll results).
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Murphy "totality of circumstances" test for presuming bias without ex-
amining voir dire testimony?36
An affirmative answer to either of these questions is troubling. As to
the first, it would mean that a Timothy McVeigh or O.J. Simpson-type
suspect, given sufficient prejudicial publicity, could escape prosecution
on the federal constitutional ground that no venue in the country could
supply an impartial jury."' Even those who accept the Simpson verdict
should reject the prospect of not being able to put a suspect on trial. An-
swering yes to the second question is equally distressing. It suggests that
even when the media coverage has interfered with a trial and thereby
compromised a defendant's constitutional rights, the court can juggle the
standard and hold a trial with a biased jury.
This article concludes that the first question is answered in the
negative. A motion to dismiss a prosecution because of pretrial publicity,
as made by McVeigh, is not viable. But the Simpson trial coverage as a
new litmus test may be part of the reason such a motion is doomed. Thus,
the second question gets an affirmative answer. Under the totality of cir-
cumstances test, as applied in Murphy, the Court could arguably use the
magnitude of coverage in Simpson-as well as any number of other fac-
tors-to evaluate the potential for bias caused by media coverage in a
later case, like McVeigh. Under the test, as applied to evaluate the bias-
ing impact of media coverage on the national venire, national coverage
of one case-and its impact-could become a factor for evaluating na-
tional coverage of another case, no matter where it occurs.
This raises the final issue-the prospect that, with the flexibility to
consider an infinite number of factors in the totality of circumstances, a
court could conclude that no level of pretrial publicity is sufficient to
create a presumption of bias. The court could then affirm the conviction
rendered by a biased jury. Some argue that such a step was taken by the
Supreme Court when it decided Mu'Min.38 Mu'Min, however, did not
reject the Court's earlier precedents in which convictions were vacated
on the basis of widespread bias to the venire resulting from extraordinary
pretrial publicity. 9 This article suggests that the critical elements of
316. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,795 (1975).
317. As a state court criminal case that cannot be revisited due to Simpson's acquittal, the
Simpson trial is discussed here because the coverage of the case was extraordinary. Burleigh, supra
note 17. Its impact on the nation is illustrative. The Simpson case also presents issues not addressed
in this article, specifically the implications for state criminal defendants facing bias in the only state
with original jurisdiction to prosecute them.
318. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (holding that a defendant was not deprived
of his Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights when the trial judge refused to question prospective
jurors about the contents of the pretrial publicity they encountered).
319. See id. at 439 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (recognizing that precedent indicates that exposure
to pretrial publicity may deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights, but stating that this case was
one of first impression because it dealt with the actual procedures necessary to protect the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury after its exposure to pretrial publicity). The Su-
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prejudicial pretrial publicity, which were the basis for the Court finding
presumed bias in the 1960s, should become a standard for determining
when contemporary trial publicity presents a sufficient probability of
juror bias so as to support constitutionally mandated content questioning
during voir dire.
Clearly, we do not want to face the prospect of a guilty, or even
potentially guilty, suspect going free without any trial on a procedural
technicality. If a motion like McVeigh's could succeed, due process
would be denied to all by the failure to hold a trial. Simultaneously, the
inverse is no more attractive-an innocent person convicted by jurors
tainted by biased media coverage. The Irvin and Murphy era cases must,
therefore, be read together to stand for the proposition that while no to-
tality of circumstances could bias the entire national venire, the national
media circus raises a presumption of exposure to bias such that a juror's
mere statement of impartiality-in the midst of the circus-is not suffi-
cient to overcome the prospect of bias.
preme Court had reversed the defendant's conviction, because of extensive prejudicial publicity. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (finding that the trial judge did not adequately
protect defendant from pretrial publicity that was "inherently prejudicial" and "saturated" the com-
munity); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965) (holding that extensive television coverage of
defendant's criminal trial violated due process considerations); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
(holding that the community in which defendant was tried had a definitive media-based bias that
inherently made all jurors partial).
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